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Abstract 
This study was conducted with the aim of analyzing factors that influence formal loan repayment 
of urban women in Tigray and evaluating the loan rationing mechanism using primary data 
collected through structured questionnaire from 169sample  women borrowers of DECSI. 
  
The estimation results of the descriptive statistics and the logit model show that level of 
education, income, loan size, number of times borrowed are important and significant factors 
that enhance the loan repayment performance.  
 
Regarding the loan rationing, borrowers who are aged, have an access of another loan, number 
of times borrowed and health expenditure, were disfavored; while those who are with high level 
of education, number of dependents, apply for larger loan amounts, celebrating social 
ceremonies, perceive supervision as adequate, high income  and loan diversion were favored. 
There were some serious problems observed in the rationing mechanism the institution 
employed, i.e., borrowers who are good payers (like those who are literate) were rationed more 
while those who contribute to the default problem (like those who have high medical expenses) 
were rationed less. The institution is particularly recommended to improve these problems 
observed in its rationing mechanism. 
 
 
 
Key Words: microfinance, loan repayment performance, loan rationing and Creditworthy 
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Chapter one 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
Many financial institutions in developing countries provide financial services such as saving and 
credit to aid several smallholder enterprises. This is an effort in line with the “Millennium 
development goals” which seeks to reduce poverty by 50% by the year 2015. However, the 
sustainability and continuity of the financial institutions to increase the volume of credit to 
stimulate the poverty reduction goal depends on the repayment rates. High repayment rates allow 
the institutions to lower the interest rates and processing costs and consequently increase 
patronage of loans. High repayment rates reduce the subsidy- dependence of the credit 
institutions to help them reach a better sustainability level. Repayment performance thus serves 
as a positive signal for increasing the volume of credit availability to various sectors of the 
economy (H.D. ACQUAH1*, J. ADDO2,2011). 
 
Hunt’s (2002) findings indicated that only a minority of women receiving credit from poverty-
oriented micro-finance programmes are controlling their loans. Many women are merely passing 
the full amount of their loans directly to their husbands, sons or sons-in-law, with little or no 
access to the income generated and receiving back only enough money to make weekly loan 
repayments. In other cases, loan management and control within the family is more complex, 
with some women keeping part of their loans for their own enterprises and passing on the 
remainder to men.  
 
In addition, lacking appropriate designs to increase borrower’s involvement in the activity 
funded by her loan, many programmes failed to reach their goals and might have even resulted in 
negative impacts on women borrowers. Related to this, Mayoux (1999) indicated that many 
programmes have had negative impacts on women. Where women have set up enterprises, this 
has often led to small increases in access to income at the cost of heavier workloads and 
repayment pressures. In many cases, the loans have been used by men to set up enterprises over 
2 
 
which women have little control. In some cases, they have been employed as unpaid family 
workers with little benefit. In others, there have been indirect benefits and improvements in 
various aspects of women's well-being as a result of greater recognition of their role in the 
household and community. While in some cases, women's increased autonomy has been 
temporary and led to withdrawal of male support. Moreover, in some programmes, there are 
increasing fears that women's small increases in income are leading to a decrease in male 
contribution to certain types of household expenditure. 
 
Ethiopian microfinance has made remarkable progress over past decades. In Ethiopia there are 
over 27 microfinance institutions, reaching over 1.8 million clients in a country of about 80 
million populations. However, it should be noted that twenty seven microfinance institutions 
meet only less than 20% of the demand for the financial service of the active poor. Unfortunately 
institutions are operating in a highly inflationary environment which has eroded institutional 
equity and increased financial expenses considerably. Only five institutions remained profitable 
and the sector was able to cover only 81% of their costs (AEMFI,2008). 
 
In Tigray there are different governmental and nongovernmental microfinance/micro credit 
institutions working in financial working in financial services. Out of which Dedebit credit and 
saving institution (DECSI) is one of the largest micro finance institutions in Ethiopia that serve 
about 425,172  clients throughout Tigray, with more than 4.3 million population. 38% of the 
DECSI borrowers are women. In terms of outreach DECSI is the second largest microfinance in 
Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the depth of outreach to the poorest(core poor) is not yet 
acceptable.(AEMF, 2008). 
 
In Adwa town there are a number of different microfinance/micro credit institutions including 
DECSI. The number clients in 2012 are 3061. Out of which 1682(55%) are women.  
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1.2 Statement of the Problem 
 
Saving and credit are integral parts of development, which enable people to be engaged in 
economic activities that enhance self-reliance. Saving and credit schemes increase the productive 
potential of poor women and men and particularly of women-headed households.  
 
The UN millennium project identifies micro credit as one of the development strategies that 
should be implemented and supported to attain the ambition of reducing world poverty by half. 
The very importance of micro finance, as a useful tool against poverty and food insecurity, has 
come from the United Nations with the designation of 2005 as the international year of micro 
credit. (UNDP, 2005) 
 
In Ethiopia, the poverty reduction strategy is becoming the operational framework to translate 
the global MDGs targets in to national action (UNDP, 2005). Micro finance service intervention 
in Ethiopia have also be considered as one of the policy instrument of the government and non 
government organizations (NGOs) to enable rural and urban poor increase out put and 
productivity, induce technology adoption, improve input and productivity, induce technology 
adoption, improve input supply, increase income, reduce poverty and attain food security. The 
sustainability of micro finance institutions that reach a large number of rural and urban poor who 
are not served by the conventional financial institutions, such as the commercial banks, has been 
a prime component of the new development strategy of Ethiopia (Wolday, 2000) 
 
The borrowed loans be invested for productive purposes and then the generated additional 
incomes be used to repay to the lending institutions to have sustainable and viable production 
process. The low repayment performance discourages the lender to promote and extend credit to 
large and fragmented poor women. Microcredit is extended to the borrowers on the basis of 
financial discipline in that clients are expected to display the required effort not only from the 
loans but also to repay their loans on time.  
 
It is generally accepted that credit, which is put to productive use, results in good returns. But 
credit provision is such a risky business that, in addition to other reasons of varied nature, it may 
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involve fraudulent and opportunistic behavior. The lender in the formal financial system is at 
disadvantage of information on the borrower’s behavior. Fortunately, group based microfinance 
system that involves peer pressure and joint liability has evolved to counter the problems of a 
conventional bank that provides a collateral banked credit alienating the poor (Mengstu, 2007).  
 
For such MFIs to be successful, they should be sustainable both financially as well as 
institutionally. On top of sustainability one has to include development effects like income on the 
target group as core measure of success. For agencies that are involved in the development or in 
assisting the development of micro-credit institution, it is recommended that profitability and 
sustainability should be the final goals, and therefore the only indicators of success 
(Rudkins,1994). 
 
Micro-finance interventions may lead to empowerment of women by increasing their incomes 
and their control over that income, enhancing their knowledge and skills in production and trade, 
and increasing their participation in household decision-making. As a result, social attitudes and 
perceptions may change, and women’s status in the household and community may be enhanced 
(Kabeer,1996). 
 
To realize the aforementioned objectives the Dedebit credit and saving institution(DECSI) 
program has been extending reasonable amounts of credits to urban women. However, the loan 
repayment performance of the beneficiaries is low, still in Adwa town woreda 32% of the 
women clients of dedebit credit and saving institution(DECSI) were not repay their loan on the 
right time in 2012  (DECSI Adwa branch). Moreover, factors contributing to the poor loan 
repayment performance of urban women are not studied more. To design appropriate lending 
strategies and procedures, information on relative importance of the factors, which affect urban 
women's loan repayment performance, is necessary.  
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1.3 Objectives of the Study 
 
    General objective 
 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the factors affecting loan repayment 
performance of urban women in Tigray. 
 
Specific objectives are 
 
• To identify socio-economic and institutional factors affecting loan repayment 
performance of urban women. 
• To identify the major factors used as a means of separating credit worthy borrowers from 
those who are not, i.e., to evaluate the efficiency of DECSI’s screening mechanism.  
• To contribute towards better credit administration with possible pay-off in improved loan 
repayment. 
 
1.4 . Research questions 
• What are the major socio-economic and institutional factors that affect loan repayment 
performance of urban women in the study area? 
• What is the extent of repayment performance of formal loan with respect to informal 
loan?  
• What characteristic of borrowers should be taken into consideration by DECSI in the 
process of screening their clients in a way that will not put in danger their financial 
position due to the default problem?  
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1.5 Significance of the Study 
 
As explained earlier, targeting credit to the poor is one of the several instruments of alleviating 
poverty. MFIs are engaged in providing credit to the poor so that they can generate income and 
employment for themselves. For these institutions to be able to render such a service on a 
permanent basis, they should be viable and sustainable. They should not depend on donations or 
subsidies in the long run. 
 
Although some studies have been conducted on the credit schemes that targeted the poor in 
Ethiopia, a study of the factors affecting formal loan repayment performance is vital because it 
provides information that will enable effective measures to be undertaken to improve loan 
repayment performance and the success of urban women credit programs. It will also enable 
lenders such as non-governmental organizations and policy makers to have knowledge as to 
where and how to channel efforts in order to minimize loan defaults. The study is also expected 
to contribute towards better credit administration with possible pay-off in improved loan 
repayment. 
 
1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
 
Although sustainability of MFIs includes financial, economic, institutional and borrower 
viability, this study focuses on only one aspect of it, i.e., borrower viability. Accordingly, the 
study focuses on loan repayment performance, screening mechanism and impact (which are all 
part of the borrower viability aspect of sustainability) based on data obtained from only one 
urban branch in 2011/2012. More specifically, it refers to the Dedebit credit and saving 
institution (DECSI) credit program in Adwa town woreda administration. However, not all the 
borrowers were include in the survey. This limitation is attributable to the financial, time and 
other resource limitations. Therefore, the study will undertake to meet its objectives within the 
limitations mentioned. 
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1.6 Organization of the thesis 
 
The rest of this thesis is organized in six sections. Section two deals with review of literature that 
includes definitions of concepts, the need for credit and empirical studies on loan repayment 
performance. Section three presents methodology with a brief description of the study area, 
sampling method and methods of data analysis. Results obtained are discussed in more detail in 
section four. Section five presents summary and policy implications. 
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Chapter two 
 
2. Literature review  
 
2.1 Definitions 
 
Beckman and Foster (1969) defined credit as the power or ability to obtain goods or services in 
exchange for a promise to pay for them later. In other words, it is the power or ability to obtain 
money, through the borrowing process, in return for a promise to repay the obligation in the 
future. According to these authors, credit represents the actual or prospective debtor’s power or 
ability to effect an exchange by offering his promise for future payment. Credit is necessary in a 
dynamic economy because of the time that elapses between the production of a good and its 
ultimate sale and consumption. The risk in extending credit is the probability that future payment 
by the borrower will not be made. Futurity is thus a basic characteristic of credit and risk is 
necessarily associated with the time element. 
 
Regarding financial institutions, there are private and governmental organizations, which serve 
the purpose of accumulating funds from savers and channeling them to individuals, households 
and businesses, needing credit. Financial institutions are composed of deposit-type institutions-
bank and non-bank-contractual saving institutions, personal and business financial companies, 
government and quasi-government agencies, and miscellaneous lenders. Formal financial 
institutions can be defined as institutions that are regulated by central bank's supervisory 
authorities for licensing and credit policy implementation. They usually use legal documents or 
the legal system to enforce contracts. 
 
Formal loans are those disbursed by financial institutions that are set up legally and engaged in 
the provision of credit and mobilization of savings. In the Ethiopian context, these institutions 
are regulated and controlled by the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). On the contrary, informal 
loans are those provided by individuals, organizations and institutions that operate outside the 
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legal banking system and control of the National Bank. Bekele (1995) indicated that informal 
credit sources are categorized as commercial (those who lend money on short-term basis to 
obtain profit) and non-commercial (lenders that generally include friends, relatives and 
neighbors). Mutual help associations include Iddir, Iqqub, modern cooperatives, NGOs, etc. 
Popiel (1994) defined informal finance as the one that comprises of all lawful but unregulated 
activities, such as rotating and non-rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), money 
lenders and money collectors and other providers of retail financial services. Iddir, Iqqub and 
Arata abedari can be incorporated into the above definition in the Ethiopian context. 
 
Default is defined as failure to pay a debt or a loan at the right time. On the contrary, non default 
is defined as payment of a debt or a loan at the right time. Hunte (1996) defined credit worthy 
(synonymous to non-defaulter) borrowers as those who satisfy the entire loan contract conditions 
and repay their loans without ever going into arrears. Non-credit worthy (defaulters), as opposed 
to non-defaulters, are those who breach their loan contracts and have repayment problems. 
 
Moral hazard is the problem that arises in the credit market when lenders fail to discern the 
actions of borrowers. It can also arise in credit markets when the behavior of the borrower is 
influenced by the terms of the loan contract. 
 
The adverse selection theory of credit markets originated with the paper by Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) (as sighted by Ghosh and Mookherjee 1999). The theory rests on two main assumptions: 
that lenders cannot distinguish between borrowers of different degrees of risk, and that loan 
contracts are subject to limited liability (i.e., if project returns are less than debt obligations, the 
borrower bears no responsibility to pay out of pocket). Credit rationing is broadly defined as a 
situation where the demand for loans exceed the supply of loans at the going interest rate. 
Different types of credit rationing have been examined in the literature. Pehlivan (1996) as cited 
in Abreham (2002) saw it from the angle of loan size where borrowers receive a lesser amount of 
loan than they requested at a given loan rate. 
 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) defined loan rationing as a situation where among loan applicants who 
appear to be identical some receive loans and others don’t, even if these rejected ones offered to 
10 
 
pay a higher interest rate or equivalently, some identifiable groups of individuals who, with a 
given supply of credit, are unable to obtain loans at any interest rate, even though with a larger 
supply of credit, they would. 
 
Jaffe and Stiglitz (1990) further broadened the classification and identified four types credit 
rationing. These are: - 1) A situation where a borrower may receive a loan of smaller amount 
than desired; 2) A situation where some individuals cannot borrow at the interest rate they 
consider appropriate based on what they perceive to be their probability of default; 3) A situation 
where a borrower may be denied credit, when a lender thinks of not being able to obtain its 
required return at any interest rate. The concept that will be addressed in this study is, the first 
type of rationing. 
 
2.2 Other Countries Experience of microfinance 
 
Empirical evidences gathered in diverse contexts suggest the prevalence of both negative and 
positive impacts of micro-finance on women socio-economic conditions. A study conducted by 
Amin et al in 1998, goes to argue that targeted credit can be used as a mechanism for enhancing 
poorer women's existing socioeconomic conditions and there by altering the relations between 
gender and class, to the benefit of the weaker parties. The authors attempted to explore the 
relationship between poor women's participation in micro-credit programmes and their 
empowerment by using empirical data from rural Bangladesh. This has been done by examining 
quantitative data collected from a representative sample consisting of female borrowers and non-
borrowers from each of five NGO program areas, and the other sample consisting of non-
borrowers from counterpart non-program areas with no significant presence of any NGO 
program. 
 
The results show that the NGO credit members are ahead of the non-members in all three indices 
of empowerment, irrespective of nonmembers' residence in programme areas or non- programme 
areas. Moreover, the non-members within NGO programme areas show a higher level of 
empowerment on the autonomy and authority indices than do the non-members within the 
comparison areas. 
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The results further indicate that education, house type, yearly income, etc., tend to be positively 
associated with autonomy and authority indices. Also positively associated are duration of NGO 
membership and non-agricultural occupations. The implications of all these findings are that 
NGO credit programmes in rural Bangladesh are not only likely to bring about rapid economic 
improvement in the situation of women but also hasten their empowerment. 
 
Contrary to what has been said above, Hossain (1984), concluded that low income women 
borrowers in Bangladesh invest cautiously in low-risk, familiar, low-productivity enterprises. A 
recent RD-12 study of loan use shows that rates of return for women’s income-generating 
activities average 145% while rates for men, 211% (Matienzo, 1993). By far, the bulk of loans 
taken by women in special credit programmes are invested in traditional activities such as paddy, 
husking, petty trade, and livestock rearing, most of which show a negative return to labor when it 
is imputed to the male agricultural wage rate. 
 
Hunt’s (2002) findings indicated that only a minority of women receiving credit from poverty-
oriented micro-finance programmes are controlling their loans. Many women are merely passing 
the full amount of their loans directly to their husbands, sons or sons-in-law, with little or no 
access to the income generated and receiving back only enough money to make weekly loan 
repayments. In other cases, loan management and control within the family is more complex, 
with some women keeping part of their loans for their own enterprises and passing on the 
remainder to men. Goetz and Gupta (1996) also found that, on average, only 37 per cent of loans 
provided by four different Bangladeshi credit organizations were either fully or significantly 
controlled by women, where significant control does not include control over marketing, and 
may thus imply little control over the income generated.  
 
In addition, lacking appropriate designs to increase borrower’s involvement in the activity 
funded by her loan, many programmes failed to reach their goals and might have even resulted in 
negative impacts on women borrowers. Related to this, Mayoux (1999) indicated that many 
programmes have had negative impacts on women. Where women have set up enterprises, this 
has often led to small increases in access to income at the cost of heavier workloads and 
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repayment pressures. In many cases, the loans have been used by men to set up enterprises over 
which women have little control. In some cases, they have been employed as unpaid family 
workers with little benefit. In others, there have been indirect benefits and improvements in 
various aspects of women's well-being as a result of greater recognition of their role in the 
household and community. While in some cases, women's increased autonomy has been 
temporary and led to withdrawal of male support. Moreover, in some programmes, there are 
increasing fears that women's small increases in income are leading to a decrease in male 
contribution to certain types of household expenditure. 
 
A review of the literature raises serious questions about the extent to which women retain control 
over assets purchased as a result of credit. Kabeer (1998) finds that microfinance has been 
effective in increasing incomes and assets, although certainly not in the poorest households. She 
found that women tend to spend income, when they do control it, on household consumption and 
‘security related assets’ such as homestead land, whereas male borrowers are more likely to 
invest in further productive activities. 
 
On the other hand researches undertaken by BRAC showed very mixed results regarding the 
impact of micro-finance on whether women are able to acquire and control assets. While one 
study found that control of assets by women has increased due to their involvement in BRAC 
groups (Pitt and Khandker, 1995), another study (Halder and Husain, 1998) found that both the 
ownership of assets and the calorie consumption of BRAC members are negatively correlated 
with length of membership in BRAC groups. This implies that the poorest BRAC members 
needed to sell some assets for debt servicing, and that they are more likely to use their loans for 
less productive activities and for consumption. 
 
2.3 The Micro-finance Experience in Ethiopia 
 
A study conducted on the Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI); found that DECSI’s 
program has had a positive impact on the livelihoods of its clients. Compared to non-clients, 
clients have experienced greater improvements over the last 12 years (2000 – 2012). Their 
situation has improved in terms of income, consumption and assets. They also seem to be more 
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food secure and less vulnerable to shocks and have a greater diversification in terms of income 
sources. The study found that the improvement in economic condition of the clients is a 
necessary condition for DECSI’s program that could lead to social and political empowerment 
for the marginalized groups. The study also concluded that economic empowerment leads to 
social and political empowerment. 
 
Teferi (2002) in his study on Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI) found out that credit 
scheme has made its own positive contribution to the beneficiaries in relation to income, access 
to educational facilities, medical facilities, household diet and savings. 
 
On the other hand, this study also indicated the negative effects of DECSI’s program. A 
considerable number of credit-financed ventures fail with a possible effect on indebtedness and 
asset depletion of clients. In addition, a high level of school dropout rates of client’s children is 
registered. This is for a purpose of shepherding animals purchased by program fund 
(Borchgrevink et al, 2005). The other study was conducted on OMO and SIDAMA micro-
finance institutions’ women clients in Awassa town, Southern Nations and Nationalities Peoples’ 
Regional State. According to this study, a majority of the clients are involved in the making and 
trading of food, and food-related products. The study also witnessed there is no diversification in 
their business activity. The reason for this is that the production of food and related items trade 
involves less risk compared to other activities. The study further found that 92% of them are not 
very much aware that the savings are more important than credit to build their future. The 
researchers’ explanation of this finding is that MFI’s savings policy is only to cover the risk 
situation rather creating any element of thrift among the clients. 
 
Nevertheless, the study argued that there is a good influence of micro credit on the urban women 
working groups in terms of income and self-employment generation. Furthermore, it also 
reflected in many cases in business improvements, decision making process and asset formation 
at low levels, and it is believed not sufficient (Padma and Getachew, 2004). 
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2.4 Microfinance Development and Women’s Participation in Ethiopia 
 
Up until the early 1990s, the sources of finance for rural and urban poor and micro and small 
enterprise operators in Ethiopia were confined only to informal sources of finance like 
moneylenders, friends and relatives (Itana et al, 2004). He further noted that, starting in the mid-
1990s, following the drought of 1984/85, some Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) 
introduced the idea of saving and credit among poor people as a strategy for rehabilitation and 
development. Later on, special government programs operated mainly in collaboration with 
international financial institutions came into the picture. However, both types of programs were 
operated in a scattered manner and lacked sustainability until 1996. 
 
Of the substantial measures taken to liberalize the financial sector, the promulgation of 
proclamation No.40/96 is most commonly cited. The proclamation provides the framework to 
create, expand and develop microfinance programs. Micro-financing is viewed as a means to 
alleviate poverty through pumping capital to subsistence agriculture and micro enterprises. 
 
Following the Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy of the EPRDF 
government, rural finance has been considered as an important tool for agricultural and food 
security (Belay, 2001). Consistent with its ADLI policy, the government had to reconsider the 
operational modality of microfinance to facilitate a very significant improvement in service 
delivery and outreach. Consequently, the government came up with Proclamation No.40 in June 
1996. The central elements of the proclamation seem to be outreach and sustainability. That is, if 
properly implemented, the proclamation has the potential to facilitate significant outreach, and 
the flourishing of several sustainable Micro-finance institutions (Meklit MFI et al, 2005). After 
the enactment of this Proclamation, about 26 MFIs have been legally registered by the National 
Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), (Wolday, 2007). 
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The importance of the micro and small enterprises sector in Ethiopia, particularly for the low-
income, poor and women groups, is evident from their relatively large presence, share of 
employment and small capital requirement. These are sufficient reasons for governments and 
other stakeholders in development to be interested in micro and small enterprises (Gebrehiwot 
and Wolday, 2001). In line with the development of micro-finance institutions, the Government 
of Ethiopia set up participatory rules and policies which gave space for women productivity. 
Padma and Swamy (2003) noted that, government has formulated and issued the Ethiopian 
Women’s Policy to speed up the economic and social advancement of women. This policy gives 
special emphasis to rural women by ‘facilitating the necessary conditions whereby they can have 
access to basic services and to ways and means of lightening their workload’. Consequently, all 
development programs at national and regional levels should be able to integrate gender 
concerns in their plans and programs to ensure that women participate, contribute, benefit, 
become recognized, and obtain technological support. Rural development programs need to 
reorient their implementation strategies so that they would target rural women as beneficiaries of 
development initiatives and programs. Within this framework, anti-poverty and women 
empowerment could be aspects of the major development strategies. 
 
Ethiopian MFIs have served 1,211,305 clients nation wide up to June 2005. The loan portfolio in 
the hands of active clients was about Br 1.5 billion. The average loan size was about Br.1000. 
Ethiopian microfinance industry is dominantly serving the rural poor. About 38 percent of clients 
of the MFIs are female (Wolday, 2007). As the overriding objective of MFIs in Ethiopia is to 
provide a broad range of micro-finance services to large numbers of poor households, it should 
be their (MFIs’) priority to accommodate remarkable numbers of women clients to accomplish 
tangible changes in the livelihood of the rural poor. 
 
2.5 Empirical Studies on Loan Repayment Performance 
 
Loan repayment performance is affected by a number of factors, some of which are believed to 
negatively influence repayment while others have positive impact. Different studies have been 
carried out concerning loan repayment performance of borrowers in various countries by 
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different authors. In what follows, the findings of studies on loan repayment performance will be 
presented. 
 
2.5.1 Literature on other Countries 
 
The analysis of determinants of loan repayment of credit groups carried out by Zeller (1998) 
indicated that groups with higher levels of social cohesion have a better repayment rate. 
Moreover, the result led to the conclusion that it is not the level of physical and human assets of 
the group members but the degree of variance of risky assets among members that contributes to 
better loan repayment. His results also indicated that heterogeneity in asset holdings among 
members, and related intra-group diversification in on and off-farm enterprises, enables members 
to share risks so as to better secure repayment of the loan. Furthermore, gains in the repayment 
rate due to risk-sharing diminish at the margin, because of increased costs of coordination, 
monitoring, and moral hazard that come with greater heterogeneity in groups. Zeller (1998) 
emphasized that policy makers and program managers should be aware that the often-postulated 
homogeneity among group members has trade-offs by reducing the group’s ability to repay 
loans in times of distress and to take advantage of risky, but more profitable, enterprises by 
spreading risks among members of the same group. 
 
Jama and Kulundu (1992) in their study on smallholder farmers' credit repayment performance in 
Kenya considered some variables which they thought were related to loan repayment 
performance and found that loan diversion, farm income, farmers' attitude toward loan 
repayment, proper amount of purchased farm inputs and source of income from farming activity 
had statistically significant effect on loan repayment performance. They also reported that the 
proportion of loan funds diverted to non-intended purposes was positively related to the 
proportion of arrears on loans and was significant at 1% probability level. In addition, late loan 
issuing and inadequate supervision and advice to farmers were positively related to the 
proportion of loan diverted and were statistically significant at 1% and 5% probability levels, 
respectively. 
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Okorie (1986) reported that four factors had a tremendous effect on the loan repayment 
performance of Ondo State smallholders in Nigeria. These factors include time of loan 
disbursement, nature of loan disbursement (in cash or in kind), number of supervisory visits 
made by credit officers after disbursement, and the profitability of enterprises on which loan 
funds were invested. Likewise, Ike (1986) classified the problems of institutional agricultural 
loan recovery in Nigeria into three: farmer related problems; structural problems; and  ankrelated 
problems. The author indicated that in Nigeria, a good percentage of farmers are illiterate, 
ignorant and misinterpret the objectives of the government in granting agricultural loans. Hence, 
loans are diverted to non-agricultural purposes, sometimes they are used for traditional 
ceremonies. He also indicated that some farmers could not manage their projects due to 
overexpansion and loan mismanagement. Inherent agricultural problems like natural hazards are 
also under the group of this problem. Structural problems relate to security, like supply and 
demand for funds and interest rate structure. Loans are usually made against security for 
agricultural production. Most of the farmers do not have tangible security. They may have 
guarantors but the main disadvantage of pledging guarantors as security is that in case of non-
repayment, they may disappear, thereby failing to fulfill their loan obligations. 
 
The bank related problems include lending policies and procedures as well as personnel capacity 
of the banks. Some bank managers do not apply the principles of good lending while giving 
loans to farmers. Related to this is the problem of skilled and adequate number of staff. Wenner 
(1995) stated that formal lenders find it difficult and costly to: accurately ascertain the likelihood 
of defaults and to monitor closely how borrowers use funds and what technologies they choose 
for project implementation. Thus, borrowers may not take actions that make repayment more 
likely (moral hazard). Weak legal system, lack of secure collateral and pervasive views that 
government bank loans are patronage, magnify loan enforcement costs for formal lenders. 
 
Matin (1997) in his study on the loan repayment performance of borrowers in Bangladesh 
obtained a significant positive relationship between household’s asset/income position/ and its 
loan default status. In his analysis, he related this situation to a very strong demonstration effect 
where borrowers having relatively small loan sizes behave in the same way as those who have 
larger loans. The education status of the household was reported to have strong negative effect 
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on default status irrespective of the household’s income position. The total operated land 
holding of the household was the other variable, which was negatively associated with default 
after a certain level. It was also indicated that housing loan increases default probability by about 
22%. 
 
Khandker et al., (1995) based on their study of Grameen Bank's microcredit operation at branch 
level reported that loan default is not completely a result of borrower's erratic behavior. Rather, 
factors like roads, electrification, educational infrastructure, borrower's age, incentives, etc., were 
reported to have a strong bearing on repayment performance. Kashuliza (1993) reported a 
positive and significant relationship between borrowers' attitude to repayment and repayment 
performance based on a case study in Tanzania. He also reported a positive relationship between 
repayment and farm income and a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between 
household size and repayment performance. 
 
Kulundu (1990) in his study on Kenyan small holder farmers using cross-sectional data found 
that loan diversion, use of purchased farm inputs, farm income and attitudes towards repayment 
had statistically significant impact on loan recovery; whereas crop performance, off-farm income 
and farmers education proved to have statistically insignificant influence on loan repayment. 
Regarding loan diversion, his results showed that inadequate supervision and technical support 
as well as delay in loan delivery had significant influence on loan repayment. 
 
Empirical study made in Guyana by Hunte (1996) using logistic model showed that certain 
factors such as activities in fishing, male borrowers in food crops and livestock credit experience 
and sugar cane production resulted in low default risks, minimum or low credit rationing (giving 
nearly the amount the borrower requested or demanded) and high repayment performance. 
Alternatively, other factors, such as extended grace period in loan contracts and long processing 
times led to high default risk and low repayment. Moreover, the result clearly showed that 
wealthy borrowers exhibited poor repayment performance. 
 
Mwinijilo (1987) studied the causes of medium term loan defaults among smallholder farmers in 
Salima Agricultural Development Division of Malawi and found that about 50 per cent of the 
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borrowers who had defaulted assigned higher priority to non-farm uses of the income accruing 
from the use of loan assets. The income generated during the repayment period was used for 
non-farm purposes such as health problems, domestic needs, payment of school fees and tax, and 
payment of private loans. These cases took priority over loan repayment. Miller (1977) also 
reported that the use of farm income for non-farm purposes led to defaults on loans offered to 
farmers. Too much rainfall, low rainfall and erratic rainfall could adversely affect farm 
productivity. This, in turn, may affect the repayment process. 
 
The study made by Kuhn and Darroch (1999) in South Africa, using a multinomial logit model 
associating loan default to various factors, indicated that clients with larger loans were less likely 
to default for such loans tended to be associated with more (verifiable) collateral, lower 
administration costs per unit of credit and probably better quality information on potential 
investment returns. 
 
Mosley (1995, cited in Bekele, 2001) investigated what he called optimal incentives to repay in 
institutional lending to low income groups in Indonesia. He identified three types of incentives 
and tried to find out the optimum levels of these incentives to optimize the payoffs of lenders and 
borrowers from the game. These were: 
• incentives to the borrower to pay on time, consisting of a discount on interest payments, 
which are refunded when all payments due have been made; 
• an incentive to the borrower consisting of a credit limit, which is expanded at the rate 
proportionate to repayment performance of the previous loan; and 
• incentives to the staff of lending institution to optimize their efficiency in monitoring and 
securing repayment by making a portion of income dependent on some indicators of the 
performance of the institution, usually profit or loan recovery. 
 
2.5.2 Literature on Ethiopia 
 
Knowledge on determinants of loan repayment is undoubtedly important for it provides 
information to the lender on the incentives available for the borrower to comply with repayment 
schedules. Empirical studies in this connection are however limited in Ethiopia, though recently 
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researchers are showing interest and hence carrying out relevant studies. As regards the 
determinants of loan repayment, Mengistu (1997) conducted a study on the Market Town 
Development Program (MTDP) credit scheme for Bahir Dar and Awassa towns using a binomial 
probit model. For Bahir Dar, the author found out that expectation of repeatloan and number of 
workers employed by the credit beneficiary were positively related to full loan repayment; while 
loan diversion and access to additional credit sources are negatively related to repayments. On 
the other hand, his findings for Awassa depict that variables like number of workers employed 
by the loanee; level of education and weekly repayment period have a positive impact on loan 
repayment while having a negative influence on loan diversion. 
 
Berhanu (1999) analyzed the determinants of full loan repayment for Project Office for the 
Creation of Small Scale Organizations (POCSSBO). His regression results indicate that variables 
like borrower's age, perceived cost of default and expediency of repayment period have positive 
impact on full loan repayment. On the other hand, he reported that loan diversion and loan size 
contribute to reduction of the probability of full loan repayment. 
 
Defaults in Ethiopia, according to Bekele (1995), may arise from three major factors. First, the 
inability of borrowers to repay the loan as a result of crop failure for various reasons. Second, 
due to unwillingness of borrowers to repay the loan viewing the loan as a grant or as a political 
patronage. The third factor could be institutional and policy problems, that is, the system of 
credit delivery and collection mechanisms of the lenders have contributed to poor loan recovery 
performance. 
 
Belay (1998) considered in his study twenty eight demographic and socio-economic variables 
which were hypothesized to influence repayment of fertilizer credit among smallholder farmers 
in the central highlands of Ethiopia, Alemgena District. Out of these variables nine were found to 
have a statistically significant potential power to discriminate between on defaulter and defaulter 
groups of the fertilizer loan. More specifically, five continuous variables, namely health care 
expenditure, amount borrowed from formal sources, experience in credit, total number of 
livestock owned and the number of days per year a farmer pays visit to a development agent for 
technical guidance and four discrete variables namely, perceived price of the output (good or 
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bad), sufficiency of holding as perceived by the household, celebration of social ceremony and 
loan diversion were found to be significant using t-and chi-square tests, respectively. 
 
Belay (1998) also indicated that out of eighteen variables entered into the stepwise regression, 
analysis eight of them were found to be statistically significant at less than 10% level. These 
variables were: experience in credit use, experience in own farm, proportion of area under teff 
and wheat production, on-farm income, number of draught oxen owned, total livestock owned in 
livestock unit, number of days that the borrowers contacted development agents for technical 
assistance, and the distance of the respondents’ village from that of the development agent. 
 
Belay (1998) suggested that diversification of credit, in terms of activities in livestock 
production, may help to reduce loan default, thereby minimizing production and market risks by 
distributing it among different enterprises. Appropriate communication channels and frequent 
bilateral communication between farmers and development agents were also believed to ensure 
timely loan repayment. The author's other recommendation was that, it is necessary to seek other 
alternative strategies such as rural credit and saving schemes or micro financing to mitigate the 
current production credit scarcity and repayment problem. The results of Belay (1998) indicate 
also that occasionally celebrated social ceremonies cost a lot of money beyond what farmers can 
afford and were found to be one of the major causes of delinquency in loan repayment. 
Therefore, he recommended strongly that elders, community leaders, local farmers' associations 
and religious organizations should make concerted effort to minimize these traditional 
ceremonies and cut sharply the associated expenditures through time. 
 
Bekele (2001) hypothesized fifteen demographic, socio-economic, natural and institutional 
variables to explain the loan repayment performances of smallholders in Amhara and Oromia 
regions of Ethiopia. His logistic regression model results show that, seven variables, namely 
timeliness of input supply, amount of formal loan per hectare, total grain production, 
participation in off-farm activities, total livestock owned in monetary terms, informal loan and 
yield loss due to bad weather were significant while the remaining eight variables were less 
powerful in explaining the variations in the dependent variable. 
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Fantahun (2000) hypothesized twenty one socio-economic variables to influence the loan 
repayment performance of Agency for Co-operation in Research and Development's (ACORD) 
Community Based Organization Revolving Credit Scheme. Accordingly, his fitted tobit model 
revealed that factors such as the size of loan issued, the use of bookkeeping and the number of 
dependents of the borrower were significant factors that influenced loan diversion at 1%, 5%, 
and 5% level of significance, respectively. The binomial probit model's estimates of the full loan 
repayment performance equation fitted by the same author showed that the variables, other 
income sources, loan supervision visits, cost of default and income from loan financed activities 
had a positive and significant impact at 1%, 5%, 5% and 1% probability level, respectively. 
 
Based on the nature of the credit market and information asymmetry, Fantahun (2000) 
hypothesized that the higher the interest rate charged on borrowed funds, the more the possibility 
of the existence of adverse selection (exante) and moral hazard (expost). Incidences of  adverse 
selection and moral hazard are on the other hand expected to affect loan repayments negatively. 
The coefficient for the rate of interest is however positive, implying that a borrower will be a 
good loan repayer as the rate of interest increases. Though, this appears apparently contradictory 
to the conjecture of the credit market model, it can be reasoned out that in a user-owned local 
financial institution, the prevalence of information asymmetry is minimal and borrowers consider 
the interest charge as own saving and hence, will be feeling as if they have higher savings at 
higher interest rates. 
 
On the other hand, Fantahun (2000) hypothesized that, the use of bookkeeping by a borrower 
would assist him to identify his repayment status at any one time and respect his repayment 
schedules. The coefficient for this variable, however, has been negative indicating that the use 
of bookkeeping contributes to poor loan repayment performance. 
 
Fantahun (2000) also indicated that if the size of loan issued to a borrower is greater than his 
project cost, it is possible that the borrower might spend that part of the loan proceed which is in 
excess of what is required to cover his business costs. This in turn could affect repayment 
negatively. On the other hand, the rate at which a borrower diverts funds and the nature of 
diversion affect repayment in one way or another. If a sizable amount of loan is diverted for 
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productive ends by the borrower, then repayment will be affected positively and vice versa 
otherwise. The author emphasized that, since loan repayment performance is an issue to carefully 
follow-up, the factors that determine full loan repayment have to be taken care of. 
 
The Community Based Organizations (CBOs) and ACORD as an intermediary have to focus on 
stringent loan supervision, high cost of default and actions that support the borrower's capacity to 
generate greater income from loan financed activities. 
 
The various studies on loan repayment performance in different countries identified the most 
probable causes of loan default. Moreover, the major independent variables such as credit 
experience, loan diversion, education level, weak supervision, etc; were analyzed using different 
models, which in turn would help to compare and contrast those findings with the results of the 
intended study so as to recommend remedies that might mitigate the problems to be identified. In 
the literature reviewed, nothing was indicated about the factors influencing loan repayment 
performance of women in general and rural women in particular. Hence, this research could 
contribute its share towards narrowing this gap. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter three 
 
3. Methodology  
3.1. Description of the study area 
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3.1.1 Location and Physical Situation 
 
According to(BOFED,2012), Tigray Regional administration is neighbored by Eritrea in the 
north, Afar Region in the East, Amhara Region in the south and Sudan in the west .The region 
has seven administrative zones. The region further divided into 34 rural woredas and 12 urban 
woredas. The region’s total area is estimated to be 53,623 square kilometers. 
 
 The Adwa Town administration (ATA) is located in the central zone of  Tigray national regional 
state. In the west, north, south and east it is bounded by the tabias of Adwa rural woreda. The 
ATA comprises of diversified topographic features with altitudes varying from1880 m.a.s.l 
around Yekatit stadium 1985 m.a.s.l in the area of Endaraesi. Due to this altitudinal ranges, ATA 
have been recognized as Weynadega(Adwa WOFED statistical bulletin,2012)  
 
Adwa, which is one of among the 12 town woreda administration in Tigray, is the site of the 
Administratives of Adwa Town wereda and  the rural woreda of Adwa. It lies1006 kms North of 
Addis Ababa and 224 kms away from the capital city of  Tigray, Mekelle.  
 
The mean monthly rainfall ATA varies from 0 mm to 245.3 mm ranges.The monthly mean 
maximum temperature ranges from 30.4 oc, which is recorded in the months of July, to 34 oc 
recorded in the month of may. Likewise, the monthly mean minimum temperature varies from 0 
oc in February  to 13.5 oc in may.( Adwa WOFED statistical bulletin,2004)  
 
 
 
 
3.1.2 Population Situation 
 
According to the 2007 population and housing census of Ethiopia projection, the total population 
of the Adwa town administration estimated to be 60,748, out of which the female population is 
27,894. The overall population density of the ATA is 2638  persons/km2.The average family size 
is 3.4 persons per household.  
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3.1.3 Infrastructure and Social Services 
 
3.1.3.1 Roads: In ATA there is a total 60.7km road, out of which 7.3 km Asphalt road,0.3 km 
cobblestone,1.5 km paved road and 15 km Gravel road. 
 
3.1.3.2 Education and Health: According to the Planning and Economic Development Office 
of Adwa town (Statistical bulletin, 2004), ATA has 4 secondary schools and 19  primary schools. 
Concerning the population size of the students, the total number of students enrolled in the 
secondary education was 8416. Of this, the number of male and female students was 4607 and 
3789, respectively. Similarly, the number of students who attended primary education was 9274. 
Of this, 4525 and 4729 were male and female students, respectively.  
 
With regard to health related services in the ATA, there is 1 hospitals, 2 health centers,19 
pharmacies (Statistical bulletin, 2004).  
 
3.1.3.3 Water Supply: According to the Planning and Economic Development Office of Adwa 
town (Statistical bulletin, 2004), In ATA there are 20km transmission network and 40km 
Distribution network. Due to this the water coverage of ATA is 96%. 
   
 
 
 
 
3.2  Data Sources, Sampling and data Collection 
 
3.2.1 Data Sources 
 
For this study, primary and secondary data were used. The primary data was collected from the 
sample of women benefiting from the micro-credit service of Dedebit credit and saving 
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institution, through structured questionnaire. Moreover, personal observations and informal 
discussions with borrowers  used to generate primary information. Secondary data was obtain 
from DECSI head office and Adwa branch, government offices and other relevant organizations. 
 
 List of borrowers was found from a book called master group register. This is a book containing 
lists of clients recognized and registered at the office along with group number, centre number, 
sex and age of clients. It also contains information on clients that quitted membership, date and 
reason for the quitting. 
 
Information obtained using the survey questionnaire includes: 
 
• Borrower characteristics like age, marital status, level of education, household size,   
occupation, etc. 
• History of loan (amount of loan, purpose and utilization of loan, etc) 
• Information on group formation (group monitoring, group responsibility, group action) 
• Information on income (from activities financed by the loan and from other sources) 
• Information like access to medical and educational facilities, nutritional status etc. 
• Information on savings and financial recording 
•  Information on borrowers’ perception of cost of default and adequacy of supervision, 
and 
• Other relevant variables. 
 
 
Information obtained from the branch office include: 
 
• Information on loan like the numbers of female borrowers, how many of them are 
defaulters  and non defaulters, etc. 
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3.2.2 Sampling and Data Collection 
3.2.2.1 Selection of study area 
 
The study area is selected purposely. According to DECSI head office, DECSI Adwa sub branch 
is one of among the sub branches which has clients with a low loan repayment performance. So, 
in order to study the determinants of loan repayment performance, DECSI Adwa town sub 
branch is favorable to the study. 
 
 3.2.2.2 Sampling method 
 
The population of the study is heterogynous. It includes two type borrowers( Non defaulter and 
Defaulter). So, in order to avoid choosing one type borrower stratified sampling method were 
selected for this study. There were two strata, the none defaulter strata and defaulter strata.   
 
According to DECSI Adwa town sub branch, In the 2011/2012 fiscal year there were 1682 urban 
women borrowers of DECSI in the ATA. Out of which 538(32%) were defaulters which is the 
defaulter strata. From this strata 32% of the total sample i.e 54(32% of 169) were selected by 
simple random sampling method. Similarly, 1144 of 1682 women borrowers were non defaulter 
which is non defaulter strata. From non defaulter strata 68% of the total sample i.e 115(68% of 
169) were selected by simple random sampling method.  
 
The sample borrowers were from all kebelles of the town. Five enumerators, who completed 
secondary education and familiar with the culture and language of the community, were 
employed to conduct the interview. 
 
Appropriate training was given to the enumerators to develop their understanding regarding the 
objectives of the study, the content of the questionnaire, how to approach the respondents and 
conduct the interview.  
 
3.3 Methods of Data Analysis 
3.3.1 Econometric Models 
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Regression models in which the regress and evoke a yes or no or present or absent response are 
known as dichotomous, or dummy, dependent variable regression models. They are applicable in 
a wide variety of fields and are used extensively in survey or census-type data (Gujarati, 1995). 
The dependent variable in this study is also a dummy variable, which takes a value of zero or one 
depending on whether or not the borrower defaults. However, the independent variables are of 
both types that are continuous or categorical. 
 
The loan repayment performance is a dependent variable, which is dichotomous taking on two 
values, one if the borrower is a non-defaulter and zero otherwise. Estimation of this type of 
relationship requires the use of qualitative response models. In this regard, the non-linear 
probability models, logit and probit models are the possible alternatives. However, several 
estimation problems arise particularly when Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and linear 
probability models are employed (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). The OLS regression technique, 
when the dependent variable is binary, produces parameter estimates that are inefficient and a 
heteroscedastic error results in the structure. Consequently, hypothesis testing and construction 
of confidence interval become inaccurate and misleading. Likewise, a linear probability model 
may generate predicted values outside the 0-1 interval, which violates one of the basic tenets of 
probability. To alleviate these problems and produce relevant empirical outcomes, the most 
widely used qualitative response models are the logit and probit models (Amemiya, 1981). 
 
3.3.2 Specification of the Logit Model 
 
This study will be intend to analyze which and how much the hypothesize regressors will be 
relate to the loan repayment performance of urban women. As already noted, the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable, which will took a value zero or one depending on whether or not a 
borrower defaulted. However, the independent variables were of both types, that is, continuous 
or categorical. 
 
Probit and logit models are similar and yield essentially identical results. Aldrich and Nelson 
(1984) indicated that in practice these models yield estimated choice probabilities that differ by 
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less than 0.02 and which can be distinguished, in the sense of statistical significance, only with 
very large samples. The choice between them therefore, revolves around practical concerns such 
as the availability and flexibility of computer programs, personal preference, experience and 
other facilities. 
 
The probit and the logit models are commonly used in studies involving qualitative choices. The 
probit probability model is associated with the cumulative normal probability function, whereas, 
the logit model assumes cumulative logistic probability distribution. The advantage of these 
models over the Linear Probability Model is that the probabilities are bound between 0 and 1. 
Moreover, they fit best the non-linear relationship between the probabilities of the dependent 
variable and the explanatory variables, that is one which approaches zero at slower and slower 
rates as an explanatory variable (Xi) gets smaller and smaller and approaches one at slower and 
slower rates as Xi gets larger and larger. Gujarati (1988), Feder et al., (1985), Aldrich and Nelson 
(1984) and Maddala (1981) have recommended probit model for functional forms with limited 
dependent variables that are continuous between 0 and 1, and logit models for discrete dependent 
variables.Hence, the logistic model is selected for this study. Therefore, the cumulative logistic 
probability model is econometrically specified as follows: 
 
 
Pi=F(Zi)=F(α+∑ β iXi)= 1  ………………………………………………………1 
                                      1+e-zi 
Where, Pi  is the probability that an individual will make a certain choice(default or does not 
default) given Xi 
              e denotes the base of natural logarithms, which is approximately equal to 2.0718; 
             Xi represents the ith explanatory variables; and 
            α and βi are parameters to be estimated 
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Hosmer and Lemeshew (1989) pointed out that the logistic model could be written in terms of 
the odds and log of odds, which enables one to understand the interpretation of the coefficients. 
The odds ratio implies the ratio of the probability (Pi) that an individual would choose an 
alternative to the probability (1-Pi) that he/she would not choose it. 
(1-Pi)      =            1          ………………………………………………………………..(2) 
                          1+ezi 
Therefore, 
 (   Pi  )      =   1+e-zi =   e zi ……………………………………………………..……………(3) 
   (1-Pi)         1+ezi 
Or, 
(   Pi  )      = (  1+e-zi )=   e (α+∑ β iXi) ………………….…………………………………………(4) 
   (1-Pi)        ( 1+ezi) 
Taking the natural logarithm of the equation(4) 
Zi= Ln(  Pi)     =  α+β1X1+ β2X2+…+ β mXm……………………………………………………..(5) 
        ( 1-Pi) 
 
If the disturbance term (Ui) is taking into account, the logit model becomes 
Zi= α +∑m β iXi +ui…………………………….……………………………………..(6) 
               
3.3.3   Working Hypotheses and Definitions of Variables 
 
Review of literatures on factors influencing loan repayment performance of borrowers, past 
research findings and the author's knowledge of the credit schemes of the study area were used to 
establish working hypotheses of this study. In other words, among a number of factors, which 
have been related to borrowers' loan repayment performance, in this study, the following 
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demographic, socio-economic and institutional factors were hypothesized to explain loan default 
situations of urban women in the study area  
 
Description of the Dependent variables together with their expected models is given below: 
Dependent variable (LR): Was defined as the loan repayment performance of borrowers, which 
is a dummy variable taking a value one if the borrower is non-defaulter and zero otherwise. 
 
the models for loan repayment is 
 
LR = f(AG, ED, LSZ, TM, LD, INCOM, INCA,ASRP, SPV, NDP, NTB ei)……………… (1) 
 
Below are given the list of the variables together with their definitions. 
 
LR= loan repayment (LR=1 if fully repaid, zero otherwise) 
 
AG= age of borrower 
 
ED= educational level of borrower 
         1= illitrate 
         2= Grade 1-8 
         3= Grade 9-12 
         4= Above grade 12 
 
LSZ= loan size in Birr 
 
TM= timeliness of loan release 
        1= if timely released 0= otherwise 
 
LD= Loan Diversion  
        1= if a borrower diverts her loan 0= otherwise 
 
32 
 
INCOM = income from activities financed by loan (annual) 
 
INCA= annual income from other activities (not financed by the loan). 
 
SRP= suitability of repayment period 
          1= if suitable      0= otherwise 
BK= use of financial records 
        1= if borrower keeps financial records     0= otherwise 
 
ASPV= adequacy of supervision visits made to a borrower 
         1= if adequate 0= otherwise 
 
NDP= number of dependents 
 
NTB=number of times borrowed 
 
HEEX =Health care expenditure in Birr  
 
CRMN=Celebration of social ceremonies  
 
ei = Error term 
 
Description of the explanatory variables together with their expected signs is given below: 
 
1. Age: Vigano (1993) noted that with increase in age, it is usually expected that borrowers get 
more stability and experience. So we expect this variable to have a positive impact on repayment 
performance. However, since as people get older, their ability to effectively use finance and 
generate income declines, the variable could also have a negative impact. It may also have a non-
linear relationship with loan repayment, where up to a certain level of age loan there is a positive 
relationship, but beyond that age the relationship changes to either negative or becomes more or 
less constant. 
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2. Educational Level of Borrower: This variable is expected to have a positive impact on 
repayment performance in general. Considering normal circumstances, a more educated 
borrower is expected to use the loan effectively as compared to a less educated one. In this case 
we expect a positive sign for the variable. 
 
3. Loan size: Von Pischke (1991) noted that efficient loan sizes fit borrowers’ repayment 
capacity and stimulate enterprise. If amount of loan released is enough for the purposes intended, 
it will have a positive impact on the borrower’s capacity to repay. If on the other hand the 
amount of loan exceeds what the borrower needs and can handle, it will be more of a burden than 
help, thereby undermining repayment performance. Also positive or negative sign may be 
expected if the loan is too small. If the loan is too small it may be easy to repay such loans thus 
enhancing performance (i.e. positive sign). However, too small loan may not bring commitment 
on borrowers to use the loan productively (Von Pischke, 1991). It may also encourage borrowers 
to divert the loan to other purposes, increasing credit risk and undermining performance, in 
which case a negative sign for the variable is expected (Vigano, 1993). 
 
4. Timeliness of loan release: If loan is disbursed in time, it is unlikely that it will be diverted to 
non-intended purposes. Johnson and Rogaly (1997) noted that timeliness of loan disbursement is 
important when loans are used for seasonal activities such as agriculture. They argued that 
complicated appraisal and approval procedures, which might delay disbursement, influence a 
program of seasonal loans for farmers who use to buy inputs. Further they noted that this could 
in turn worsen the prospects of repayment by diverting loan to non-intended purpose. In such 
cases a positive sign is expected. 
 
5. Loan diversion: The impact of this Variable depends on what use the diverted loan is put to. 
If the used for productive purposes than the intended ones then repayment will be enhanced. If 
on the other hand the loan is diverted to non-productive uses, it will have a negative impact. 
Therefore the sing of this variable can’t be predetermined. 
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6. Income from activities financed by the loan: Through increased capacity of the borrower to 
repay loan, an increase in the borrowers income from the business financed by the loan would be 
expected to have a positive influence on his/her repayment performance. This is based on the 
assumption that it is the ability to pay rather than willingness to pay that affects repayment. 
Kashuliza (1993) has concluded that farmers who obtained higher income from farming were 
more likely to repay their loans. But sometimes borrowers may be tempted not to repay if they 
see that the success of their business is such that they no mare need credit from the lending 
institution, as Adeyemo(1984) has shown in his study about loan delinquency in a Nigerian 
multipurpose cooperative union. Hence this variable may have positive or negative sign 
 
7. Income from other activities or sources: Some borrowers may have other sources of income 
like income from employment in government or private organizations of the borrower or other 
members of the family, pension, etc. Such sources of income are expected to have positive 
contribution towards loan repayment performance. But if availability of such sources creates 
carelessness on the part of borrowers in fulfilling their obligation of repayment possibly 
considering the next loan unnecessary, it may well undermine repayment performance. Hence 
this variable may assume positive or negative sing. 
 
8. Suitability of Repayment period: It is expected that borrowers who find the repayment 
period suitable, perform better. Hence we expect a positive sign for this variable in this case. 
 
9. Loan supervision: If there is a continuous follow up and supervision visit to evaluate the loan 
utilization and repayment, this makes borrowers to observe their obligation and improve the 
proper utilization of the loan thereby improving repayment performance. Therefore we expect a 
positive relationship. 
 
10. Availability of other sources of credit: If borrowers have other sources of credit, they may 
use these sources to be able to settle their loan obligation in case they want to continue 
borrowing from the same source. Therefore we expect a positive sign. On the other hand 
borrowers may feel careless in repaying their loan if they decide they no more want to borrow 
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from the same source because they can get loan from the alternative sources. In such cases it may 
take a negative sign. 
 
11.Number of times borrowed: If a borrower is a repeat borrowers she may have acquired more 
experience on the institution’s rules and regulations, and hence could efficiently utilize the loan 
for the intended purpose. It is expected to have a positive impact on loan repayment  
performance. 
 
12. Health care expenditure in Birr (HEEX): Illness of family members increases 
expenditures in consumption and credit need from other sources to finance medicaments and 
health care. Therefore, health related expenses are expected to reduce borrowers' capacity to 
repay loans in time (Belay, 1998; Bekele, 2001). 
 
13. Celebration of social ceremonies (CRMN): These are ceremonies celebrated occasionally 
such as wedding, burial (funeral) and others. The expenses on these ceremonies are some times 
too large relative to borrowers' economic status. If a person has celebrated one or more of these, 
CRMN takes a value one, but zero otherwise. As this variable can be a proxy for use of income 
for non productive purposes, it is expected to have a negative impact on loan repayment  
performance. 
 
3.3. 4 Loan Screening (Rationing) Mechanism 
 
The method of analysis employed by Hunte (1996) stands appropriate for this section of the 
study Unlike the loan repayment equation, the dependent variable for the loan rationing equation 
is continuous and limited between 0 and 1, i.e., we have some who are rationed loan and others 
who are not (with varying degrees). Since we are going to use a dummy variable by defining 
loan rationing to be equal to 1 if a borrower is not rationed and zero otherwise. The model we are 
going to use will be the logit model, which will be given as: 
 
LRN = βXi + ei………………………………………………………………………(1) 
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LRN  = is loan rationing (LRN=1 if a borrower is not rationed and zero otherwise). 
 
Xi= set of explanatory variables 
 
 ei = Error terms 
 
Note that LRNi* are latent variables like the LRNi*'s. All the explanatory variables of loan 
repayment equation are to be employed by the LRN equation as well. Comparison of the sign 
and level of significance of the estimates in the two equations, i.e., loan repayment and loan 
rationing equations, will accomplish the task of evaluating the accuracy of the screening 
mechanism as done in Hunte (1996). 
 
Accordingly, if a variable is significant in the rationing equation but not in the repayment 
equation, it implies that variable is useless as a means of screening. This is because, there is no 
information observed on default probabilities, since the variable is insignificant in the loan 
repayment equation. Alternatively, if a variable is significant in the repayment equation but not 
in the rationing equation, it reveals that the lending institution is ignoring useful information that 
will help to identify creditworthy applicants clearly. 
 
A significant positive sign in both equations indicates the accuracy of the screening mechanism 
in identifying good borrowers while a significant negative sign in both equations reveals that the 
screening mechanism is efficient in identifying default prone borrowers. If a variable is 
significantly positive in the rationing equation but is significantly negative in the repayment 
equation, it shows that there is weakness in the screening mechanism since it is attracting default 
prone borrowers. On the other hand if a variable is significantly negative in the rationing 
equation but is positive in the repayment equation, it indicates that the screening mechanism is 
incorrectly rationing credit too strictly to credit worthy borrowers. 
 
Since we are interested in comparing the coefficients of the estimated model with that from the 
loan repayment equation in an effort to evaluate the efficiency of the screening of borrowers 
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using the methods suggested above, we are not going into the details of the expected results of 
the variables. 
 
Chapter four 
 
 
4. Results and Discussions 
 
This chapter presents the results from the descriptive and econometric analyses. The descriptive 
analysis made use of tools such as mean, percentage, standard deviation and frequency 
distribution. In addition, the t- statistics was employed to compare defaulters and non-defaulters 
group with respect to some explanatory variables. Econometric analysis was carried out to 
identify the most important factors that affect the loan repayment performance and to measure 
the relative importance of significant explanatory variables on loan repayment. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
As reported earlier in chapter three, In 2011/2012 fiscal year there were 1682 urban women 
borrowers of DECSI in the ATA. These borrowers were from all kebelles of the town. Of the 
total 1682  borrowers 169 borrowers (10% of the total urban women borrower) were selected by 
both stratified and simple random sampling method and include in the survey.  
 
4.1.1 Demographic and Socio-economic Characteristics of the Sampled Households 
 
The average age of sample  women was about 38.2 years with the minimum and maximum ages 
of 20 and 70 years, respectively.  
 
Table1 Age structure of the borrowers by borrower group 
 
Age group Non-defaulters Defaulters Total 
 Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
20-35 67 28.26 26 48.15 93 55.03 
36-45 28 24.35 2 3.7 30 17.75 
>45 20 17.39 26 48.15 46 27.22 
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Total 115 100 54 100 169 100 
  Source: Survey results                                                                  
                            
Table 1 indicates that of the total sample respondents, 115 were non-defaulters, whereas 54 were 
defaulters. Similarly, the table shows clearly that 55.3 and 27.22 percent of the sample 
respondents were within the age brackets of 20-35 and older than 45 years, respectively. 
Whereas those respondents who within the age brackets of 36-45 years represented about 17.75 
percent of the sample borrowers. 
 
In terms of educational background, most of the borrowers in the sample, i.e., 129(76.33%) can 
read and write. Those who have not attended either elementary or junior secondary school are 
40(23.67). Most of those who are illiterate i.e.,20(50% of sample illiterate) are in the age group 
above 60. While most of those who attended grades9-12 above(i.e.,45% )are in the younger age 
group 20-35. (See table 2 below). 
 
Table 2 Respondents by age group and level of education  
 
Age group                                  Level of education  Total 
Illiterate  Grade 1-8 Grade9-12 Above 12 
20-29 5 19 21 9 54 
30-39 3 16 18 7 44 
40-49 1 11 9 4 25 
50-59 11 10 1 0 22 
Above 60 20 4 0 0 24 
Total 40 60 49 20 169 
Source: Survey results 
 
As can be seen from the table 3 below 40(23.67%) keep financial records, while only 
40(23.67%) of the borrowers are illiterate, 39(97.5%) being non-users of financial recording. So 
the large proportion of illiterate beneficiaries in the sample explains the poor status of financial 
recording habits only 1 (2.5%) of the total illiterate borrowers in the sample keep record. Most of 
those who don’t use financial records, i.e., 76 out of 127, which is 59.84% reported lack of 
knowledge as the main reason for not recording their financial transactions, while the remaining 
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49(38.58%) reported their financial position as being too little to keep records, and the rest 
2(1.57%) reported no need to keep records. 
 
Table 3  Financial recording habits and level of education. 
 
Loan 
repayment 
performance 
Using financial 
recording 
                                 Level of education  Sub Total 
Illiterate  Grade 1-8 Grade9-
12 
Above 12  
Non 
defaulter 
No 7 28 31 10 76 
Yes 0 12 17 10 39 
Sub Total 7 40 48 20 115 
Defaulter No 32 20 1 0 53 
Yes 1 0 0 0 1 
Sub Total 33 20 1 0 54 
 Total 40 60 49 20 169 
Source: Survey results 
 
In line with the existence of  educated non defaulter borrowers  108(93.91%) being able to attend 
grades 1 through 12 as compared to only 21(38.89%) of the defaulter borrowers being able to 
attend the same level of education, the number of non defaulter borrowers that keep records are 
39(33.91%) while that for the defaulter borrowers is only 1(1.85%). 
 
The mean loan amount is Birr 4106.51 with the minimum and maximum amount being Birr 1500 
and Birr 20000 respectively. 
 
In terms of sufficiency of the loan amounts released, table 6 below shows that  138(81.66%) of 
the borrowers in the sample reported the loans they received to be sufficient for the purpose they 
planned. On the other hand 31 (18.34%) i.e., 19 (35.2%) of the defaulter borrowers and 12 
(10.43%) of the non defaulter borrowers declared that the loan amount they took was not 
sufficient. This has some implication for loan diversion. 
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Table4  Respondents by loan repayment performance and opinion on sufficiency of loan  
size 
 
Sufficiency of loan amount Non defaulter defaulter Total 
No 12 19 31 
Yes 103 35 138 
Total 115 54 169 
Source: Survey results 
 
With respect to the purpose for which loan was taken, we observe that the majority of the 
borrowers, i.e., 166 (98.22%) took the loan for petty trade. The next activity for which most of 
the borrowers took loan is to purchase house equipment, 2 (1.2%),and 1 borrower took the loan 
for fattening . 
 
Table 5 Respondents by loan repayment performance and the purpose for which they took the 
loans. 
 
Purpose Defaulter Non defaulter Total  
Petty trade 53 113 166 
Fattening  1 0 1 
Purchase of house equipment 0 2 2 
Total 54 115 169 
Source: Survey results 
 
To see if at all purpose of borrowing has some association with loan repayment performance, 
table 5 is constructed from the survey data. Accordingly  68.1% of those who borrowed for the 
purpose of petty trade were non-defaulters.  
 
Sufficiency of supervision on loan utilization is an important factor contributing to a better loan 
repayment performance. 74 (55.22 %) of the respondents in the sample declared that supervision 
on loan utilization is not sufficient. 
 
Table 6  Respondents’ perception on adequacy of loan supervision. 
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Sufficiency of supervision Non defaulter Defaulter Total  
No 41 33 74 
Yes 50 10 60 
Total  91 43 134 
Source: Survey results 
 
From the table above, 50(54.95%) of the non defaulter borrowers and 10 (23.26%) of the 
defaulter borrowers in the sample reported that supervision is adequate, while 41 (45.05%) of the 
non defaulter respondents and 33 (76.74%) of the urban respondents said that supervision on 
loan utilization is insufficient. 
 
Regarding suitability of repayment only 169(99.4%) of the sample respondents are of the opinion 
that the repayment period is suitable.   
 
Another finding is that 47(27.81%) of the sample borrowers have violated the loan agreement, all 
of them diverting the loan proceeds to other purposes than they planned. Of these 4(8.51%) 
reported that the loan agreement didn’t match with their true intention they had in their mind, 
while 4(8.51%) reported market problem, 17(36.17%) too small loan amount and 15(31.91%) 
reported other reasons for not keeping their agreement. See table 7 below.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table7 Reason for loan diversion 
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Reason for loan   diversion  Freq. Percent 
Loan amount was not enough for the intended purpose 17 36.17 
Loan agreement did not coincide with my initial intention 4 8.51 
Market problem 4 8.51 
To repay another loan  7 14.89 
Buying fixed assets 12 25.53 
For food 1 2.13 
To cover social ceremony expenditure  2 4.26 
Total 47 100 
Source: Survey results 
Looking at how loan is rationed, we observe that 30(17.75%) of the total respondents were 
rationed of which18 (60 %) are defaulters. In relation to loan diversion, the institution favored 
non-diverters by rationing only 6(20%) as compared to 24(80%) who were diverters being 
rationed. See table 8 below. More will be said about loan rationing in section 4.3 below. 
 
Table 8 Rationing by Loan diversion 
 
 Diverted Not diverted Total 
Rationed 24(80%) 6(20%) 30(100%) 
Not rationed 23(16.55%) 116(83.45%) 139(100%) 
Total 47(27.81%) 122(72.19%) 169(100%) 
Source: Survey results 
 
According to the results of the sample survey, all the borrowers in the sample believe that loan 
should be repaid. Similarly all borrowers interviewed have reported that the loan was issued 
timely. Many studies have considered attitude of borrowers towards loan repayment and 
timeliness of loan issuance as important variables affecting loan repayment performance. These 
two variables, however, are not going to be used in this study for regression, since they perfectly 
predict the probability of repaying loan in time; and hence are excluded from the loan repayment 
equation. 
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Since the credit delivery mechanism of DECSI is a group based one that relies on peer pressure 
and social sanctions that exist among borrowers, questions regarding these issues were included 
in the survey questionnaires. Almost all of the borrowers responded “yes” to questions regarding 
peer group that they know each other very well, feel responsible for each other and monitor each 
others’ action. 
 
Another variable of concern in this study is borrowers’ attitude to cost of default. Of the total 
respondents almost all, i.e., 152(89.94%) reported that cost of default is high. Such an attitude 
has a clear implication in terms of improving loan repayment performance. Regarding the 
perceived costs of default 104(61.54%), i.e. the majority of the borrowers responded fear of 
losing another loan in the future the most important factor forcing them to repay their loans in 
time. 
  
Table 9  Perceived cost of default 
 
Perceive Cost of default Frequency Percent 
Claims against personal wealth 22 14.47 
Claims against wealth of guarantors 2 1.32 
Social sanction 2 1.32 
Fear of losing another loan 104 68.42 
The interest rate 22 14.47 
Total 152 100 
Source: Survey results 
 
On the other hand, during the survey it was observed from informal discussions with borrowers 
that many borrowers who took loans for petty trade. Also some borrowers shift between the 
lending institution and moneylenders, i.e., they borrow from moneylenders for a very short 
period in order to repay the loan they took from DECSI and then they immediately repay the 
money lenders after DECSI releases the next cycle of loan. 
 
According to the results of the sample survey, it was known that 108(63.91%) of the sample 
respondents were found to have informal sources of credit in addition to that of DECSI. Out of 
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these 37(34.26%) reported moneylenders as their additional source of credit, 30(27.78%) from 
equb and eddir while the rest 41(37.96%) indicated that they also borrow from friends or 
relatives since their participation in the credit scheme by DECSI. See table10 below. 
 
Table10  Other source of credit 
Other source of credit Freq. Percent 
Edir/equb 30 27.78 
Money lenders 37 34.26 
Friends/relatives 41 37.96 
Total 108 100 
Source: Survey results 
 
Household size is another important variable considered in this study. The mean number of 
dependents  is 1.72 varying between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 6.  
 
Table 11 Descriptive statistics on number of dependents 
 
Number of dependents  Number defaulter Number of non defaulter Total 
0 14 41 55 
1 3 19 22 
2 12 32 44 
3 6 15 21 
4 11 7 18 
5 7 1 8 
6 1 0 1 
Total 54 115 169 
Source: Survey results 
 
As shown in table 12 about 94 (55.62%) of the borrowers in the sample reported they were 
having income source before the loan program.  
 
Table 12  Respondents by availability of source of income before and after program 
 
Availability of income source  Before loan After loan 
frequency percent frequency percent 
45 
 
Yes 94 55.62 55 32.54 
No 75 44.38 114 67.46 
Total 169 100 169 100 
Source: Survey results 
 
According to the survey results 55(32.54%) of the sample borrowers have managed to create 
additional sources of income after participation in the credit scheme (See table 12 above). On the 
other hand as shown in table 13 below the majority of the borrowers, i.e., 26(27.37%) earn an 
annual income  Birr > 5000 before loan, where as 46(80.7%) were earning the same level of 
income after participating in the loan scheme.  
 
Table 13 Respondents by household annual income before and after loan 
 
Income Range  Before the loan from DECSI After the loan from DECSI 
Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent  
<1000 0 0 0 0 
1001-2000 11 11.57 2 3.5 
2001-3000 21 22.11 1 1.75 
3001-4000 22 23.16 1 1.75 
4001-5000 15 15.79 7 12.28 
>5000 26 27.37 46 80.7 
Total 95 100 57 100 
Source: Survey results 
 
Credit facility coupled with savings services is of much help in smoothing the income and 
consumption pattern of the poor. Accordingly only one of the respondents responded about her 
having saving before participation in the program, while 167 (98.82%) of them reported of 
having savings after the program, mostly saving 50 and below 50 Birr per month (i.e., about 
84.61%). 56.21% of the sample borrower those who have saving account after the loan are 
saving nothing . which shows that much have to be done in terms of mobilizing more savings.  
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Table 14 monthly saving amount after the loan 
 
monthly saving amount after the loan Freq. Percent 
0 95 56.21 
50 48 28.40 
100 15 8.88 
150 2 1.18 
200 1 0.59 
300 8 4.73 
Total 169 100 
 
Table 15  Response on availability of savings before and after loan from DECSI 
 
Response given Before the loan from DECSI After the loan from DECSI 
Frequency percent Frequency  Percent 
Yes 21 12.42 167 98.82 
No  148 87.58 2 1.18 
Total  169 1000 169 100 
Source: Survey results 
 
Regarding access to medical facilities 149(88.17%) of the respondents of reported having access 
to medical facilities. 20(11.83%) reported of not having any access, the number of borrowers 
who reported themselves as being bearers of medical expenditure were 84(55.63%), other family 
member 57(37.75%), free service 4(2.65%) while that for borrower and other family member 
were 6(3.97%).This can be seen from table 17 below. 
 
Table 16  Response on the bearer of medical expenditure 
 
Bearer of the medical expenditure Before the loan Percent 
Borrower her self 84 55.63 
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Other family member 57 37.75 
Relatives 0 0 
Free service  4 2.65 
Borrower and other family members 6 3.97 
Total  151 100 
Source: Survey results 
 
In terms of medical expenditure before loan and after loan, the mean annual  expenditure is Birr 
65.97 and Birr 221.4 ranging between Birr 0 to Birr 500 for the former and between Birr 0 to 
Birr 1000 for the latter. Although we shall test whether the credit scheme has brought about any 
change in this respect in section 4.3, it is obvious that the average expenditure on health services 
has increased after the program. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table17 Summary statistics on expenditure items and number of enrollment of school 
age students 
 
 N Minimum Maximum  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Medical expenditure before the loan 159 0 500 65.97 87.53 
Medical expenditure after  the loan 154 0 1000 221.49 181.39 
Number of school age students enrolled before the loan 140 0 5 0.84 1.28 
Number of school age students enrolled after  the loan 193 0 4 1.156 1.19 
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Educational expenditure before the loan 162 0 1000 68.83 146.81 
Educational expenditure after  the loan 169 0 3000 273.31 429.48 
Annual Consumption expenditure before the loan 169 1000 32000 6248.52 4198.10 
Consumption expenditure before the loan 169 3000 35000 8129.59 4975.39 
Source: Survey results 
 
Similarly the mean number of school-age students enrolled has increased from 0.84 to 1.156, 
while the expenditure on education has shown an increment of Birr 204.48 on the average. The 
same is true of mean consumption expenditure, which has shown an increment of Birr 1881.07 
on the average as shown in table 17. These comparisons are made based on the data collected 
before and after participation in the credit scheme, which ranges from one to five years.  
 
Concerning social ceremonies in the study area, other than those commonly celebrated, New 
year, gena, fasica, Of the total respondents 45.83% reported that they had celebrated one or more 
of these occasional ceremonies and 54.17% stated that they had not celebrated any of them 
during the study period. 
 
4.1.2 Creditworthy Versus Non-Creditworthy Borrowers 
 
In this section we will try to compare creditworthy borrowers with defaulters, in an attempt to 
identify the factors that influence the loan repayment behavior of borrowers. Although, the 
number of the defaulters in the sample is small compared to those who settled their loans, the 
comparison will somehow give an idea as to how our variables are influence the loan repayment 
performance. The comparison is done using t-test. 
 
As shown in section 4.1 we have seen that 169(68%) of the sample borrowers have settled their 
loans in full and hence are creditworthy; while the rest 54 (32%) are defaulters. The mean age for 
creditworthy borrowers 36.21 is less than that of defaulters, which is 42.35. This implies 
defaulters are older than non-defaulters. 
 
Table 18 comparison of credit worthy and non credit worthy borrowers in the case of level 
of education 
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Description Non defaulter Defaulter t-value Total 
Mean 
 
Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev. 
 
Mean Std.Dev.
 
Level of education 9-12 .83 Illiterate .53 -10.53* 9-12 .95 
 *significant at 1% 
 Source: Survey results 
 
There is significant difference between the two groups in terms of level of education, since 
creditworthy borrowers have attended on average grades 9-12 while defaulters are on average 
illiterate. This shows the existence of a positive relationship between education and loan 
repayment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19 comparison of credit worthy and non credit worthy borrowers in terms of loan 
size 
 
Description Non defaulter Defaulter t-value Total 
Mean 
 
Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev. 
 
Mean Std.Dev.
 
Loan size 4993.9 2617.29 4666.67 2586.25 -0.71 4875.74 2603.67 
Source: Survey results 
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The mean loan size for credit worthy borrowers is Birr 4973.91 which is greater than that of the 
defaulters (Birr 4666.67) showing that there is a positive relationship between loan size and loan 
repayment performance. This could be due to the rationing mechanism although the difference is 
not significant according to the t-test. 
 
Table 20 comparison of credit worthy and non credit worthy borrowers in terms of loan 
diversion 
 
Description Non defaulter Defaulter t-value Total 
Mean 
 
Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev. 
 
Mean Std.Dev.
 
Loan diversion .0870 .2830 .6851 .4688 10.28* .2781 .4494 
*significant at 1% 
Source: Survey results 
 
Regarding loan diversion, 68.52% of the defaulters have diverted the loans they received to other 
purposes than specified in their loan agreement, while only 8.7% of the creditworthy borrowers 
diverted the loan they took to other purposes. This shows that loan diversion is negatively related 
to loan repayment performance. The t-test shows that there is a significant difference between 
the two groups of borrowers in terms of loan diversion. 
 
Table 21 comparison of credit worthy and non credit worthy borrowers with respect to 
perception of borrowers about supervision on loan utilization 
 
Description Non defaulter Defaulter t-value Total 
Mean 
 
Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev. 
 
Mean Std.Dev.
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Loan supervision 
adequacy 
.5495 .5003 .2326 .4275 -3.58* .4478 .4991 
*significant at 1% 
Source: Survey results 
 
With respect to perception of borrowers about supervision on loan utilization 54.95% of the 
creditworthy borrowers think that supervision of on loan utilization is adequate, while only 
23.26% of the defaulters are of the opinion that the supervision on loan utilization by DECSI 
staff is sufficient. So the relationship between supervision and repayment performance seems to 
be positive as expected. The t-test shows that there is a significant difference between the two 
groups of borrowers in terms of loan supervision adequacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 22 comparison of credit worthy and non credit worthy borrowers regarding 
perception of suitability of repayment period 
 
Description Non defaulter Defaulter t-value Total 
Mean 
 
Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev. 
 
Mean Std.Dev.
 
Suitability of 
repayment period  
1 0 .98 .136 -1.46 .994 .0769 
Source: Survey results 
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Regarding perception of suitability of repayment period 100% of the respondents who consider it 
as suitable are creditworthy, which is greater than the corresponding figure for the noncredit 
worthy borrower (98%).  This is an indication that the variable under consideration is positively 
related with repayment performance. the difference is not significant according to the t-test. 
 
Table 23 comparison of credit worthy and non credit worthy borrowers in terms of income 
financed from activities from loan 
 
Description Non defaulter Defaulter t-value Total 
Mean 
 
Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev. 
 
Mean Std.Dev.
 
Income financed 
from activities from 
the loan   
4001-
5000 
1.211 2001-
3000 
1.258 -8.995* 2001-
3000 
1.562 
*significant at 1% 
Source: Survey results 
 
 
The mean annual income from the activities financed by the loan for the case of creditworthy 
borrowers is Birr 4001-5000 while that for defaulters is below Birr 2001-3000, the difference 
between the two groups being significant. 
 
As explained earlier from a total of 50 borrowers who diverted their loans 18(36%) have 
indicated the fact that the loan amount was not enough for intended purpose , while 7(14%) of 
them to repay another loan , of which 6 (12%) indicated the loan agreement did not coincide with 
initial intension a reason for their diverting the loan they received and the rest 15(30%) gave 
other reasons for diverting the loan. In health expenditure regard the mean annual health 
expenditure of creditworthy borrowers is Birr 233.43 while that for defaulters is below Birr 
195.1, though the difference between the two groups is not significant. 
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Table 24 comparison of credit worthy and non credit worthy borrowers in terms of 
number of dependents 
 
Description Non defaulter Defaulter t-value Total 
Mean 
 
Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev. 
 
Mean Std.Dev.
 
Number of 
dependents  
1.4 1.3 2.4 1.83 4.08* 1.72 1.56 
*significant at 1% 
Source: Survey results 
 
The mean number of dependents for the creditworthy borrowers is 1.4, which is less than that for 
the defaulters (2.4). Here we observe that defaulters support on average a bigger number of 
dependents than creditworthy borrowers, there is significance difference between both. This is  
saying that the number of dependents that are supported by the borrowers is negatively related to 
loan repayment performance. 
 
The other informal sources of credit for urban women, identified during the survey were 
shopkeepers, friends and relatives. These sources were linked with kinship, cultural and social 
ties in which the borrowers found themselves. The survey result confirmed that 100% of the 
money borrowed from these sources was repaid prior to settling DECSI credit. Table 25, 
summarizes the amount borrowed and repaid from these informal sources. The loan from these 
sources had no interest attached to it. 
 
Table 25 comparison of credit worthy and non credit worthy borrowers regarding loan 
from informal sources and repayment status 
     
Source of informal 
credit     
Type of borrower Amount 
borrowed 
Amount 
repaid 
Recovery 
rate(%) defaulter Non Total 
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defaulter
equb 16 14 30 54900 54900 100 
Money lenders 12 25 37 84900 84900 100 
Frinds/relatives 15 26 41 54400 54400 100 
total 43 65 108 194200 194200 100 
Source: Survey results 
 
Table 25 indicates that27.8 %, 34.26 % and37.96 % of the sample borrowers had obtained credit 
from equb, money lenders and friends/relatives. The recovery rate for all was 100%. 
 
The comparison of the differences between the means of the loan received from friends, from 
relatives and shopkeepers of non-defaulters and defaulters group revealed that the values were 
not statistically significant at conventional levels of probability. 
 
4.1.3 Rationed Versus Non-Rationed Borrowers 
 
The term rationing in this study refers to a situation where a borrower receives an  mount of loan 
that is less than he/she requested. (See chapter two). As described in section 4.1, the proportion 
of those who are rationed (i.e. given loan amounts that are less than requested) is 17.18%, while 
the rest 82.18% were not rationed. The mean age of those borrowers who are rationed is 36.6, 
which is lower than the mean age of the borrowers who are not rationed 38.51. That is younger 
borrowers are more rationed than their older counterparts as is expected. 
 
Let us compare the difference between the two groups with respect to education by categorizing 
borrowers into those who have no education (illiterate) and those who have gone to school 
(literate). Accordingly 40(23.67%) of the respondents are illiterate while the rest 129(76.33%) 
borrower has gone to school. 22(17.05%) of the literate borrowers were rationed while only 
8(20%) of the illiterate borrowers were rationed, showing that the institution is rationing illiterate 
borrowers more. 
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The mean loan amount released to the borrowers who are rationed (Birr 3283.33) is less than that 
for the non-rationed borrowers (Birr 4284.17).Here we observe that the more borrowers apply 
for larger loans the more they are not rationed, just in the way explained above. 
 
Table 26 comparison of  rationed and non rationed borrowers in terms of adequacy loan 
supervision 
Description Rationed Not rationed t-value Total 
Mean 
 
Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev. 
 
Mean Std.Dev.
 
adequacy of loan 
supervision 
.4444 .5064 .4486 .4997 0.0385 .4478 .4991 
Source: Survey results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27 comparison of rationed and non rationed borrowers regarding suitability of 
repayment period 
 
Description Rationed Not rationed t-value Total 
Mean 
 
Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev. 
 
Mean Std.Dev.
 
Suitability of 
repayment period 
1 0 .99 0.84 -0.46 0.994 0.76 
Source: Survey results 
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The proportion of borrowers who are rationed and non-rationed is little bit difference when one 
considers borrowers who perceive supervision as adequate, i.e., 44.44% and 44.86% 
respectively. In fact there is a slight difference between the two groups with the proportion of 
those who are not rationed being slightly more than that for the former group, though the 
difference is very far from being significant. Similarly 100% of those who perceive repayment 
period as suitable are rationed, while the corresponding figure for those who are not rationed is 
99.3%, indicating a positive relationship. The difference between the two groups though is not 
significant. 
 
The other variable of interest is number of dependents supported by the borrowers both within 
the household and outside. The difference between the two groups in this respect is again 
significant. Here we observe that the mean number of dependents for the former group (the 
rationed group) is 2.1, which is greater than that for the latter group( the non rationed group) is 
1.65. So this variable is negatively related to the loan rationing as is expected. 
 
Concerning loan diversion 51.06 % of the diverters are rationed while only 4.9 % of the non 
diverters were rationed, which is in line with our expectation. The difference between the two 
groups is significant in this regard. 
 
4.2. Econometric Analysis 
 
In this section the method of model estimation will be presented and the estimation results will 
be discussed in detail. An attempt will be made to compare the results obtained from the 
descriptive analysis given in the previous section with those obtained from the econometric 
estimation. 
 
4.2.1 Determinants of Loan repayment performance 
 
As discussed earlier, the logit econometric model was selected for analyzing the factors 
influencing the loan repayment performance of the borrowers. Prior to running the logistic 
regression analysis both the continuous and discrete explanatory variables were checked for the 
existence of multicollinearity. In this research, in order to minimize or to avoid the existence of 
multicollinearity robust standard errors was used. 
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Table 28 Maximum likelihood estimate of a logit model for loan repayment performance 
Logistic regression                                                                               Number of obs   =        113 
                                                                                                             Wald chi2(11)   =      46.88 
                                                                                                              Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -14.762433                                                  Pseudo R2       =     0.7837 
 
lr Coef. Robust std.Err z P>|z| 
ag   .0688239 .0485782 1.42 0.157     
ed 2.904593*** 1.663906 1.75 0.081 
ndl -1.583121 1.662803 -0.95 0.341 
ndp -.3349244 .4926239 -0.68 0.497 
aspv 1.118842 1.377519 0.81 0.417 
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* Significance at 1% ** Significance at 5% *** Significance at 10% 
       
Among the variables that were thought to affect loan repayment performance, variables like 
timeliness of loan issuance and cost of default are excluded due to the reasons explained in the 
descriptive analysis section. Variables like, use of financial recording methods, income from 
other sources and suitability of repayment period are dropped because they were inestimable 
using the software. 
 
Four of the eleven explanatory variables used in the estimation of loan repayment performance 
equation were found significant. According to the estimates, even though the loan diversion is  in 
significant, it is negatively related to loan repayment performance as expected. The negative sign 
probably implies the use of diverted funds for non-income generating purposes. similarly, 
Number of dependents in the family, Availability of other sources of credit,  health expenditure 
and celebrating social ceremonies are all negatively related to the probability of loan repayment, 
none being inconsistent with prior expectation. This result is consistent with the findings in 
Teferi (2000) and Berhanu (1999). 
 
incom 1.164507** .4564657 2.55 0.011 
lsz .00035** .0001586 2.21 0.027 
ld -1.350102 1.074333 -1.26 0.209 
ntb 1.793008* .5343741 3.36 0.001 
Heex -.0035013 .0021299 -1.64 0.100 
Crsc -.525307 1.10454 -0.48 0.634 
con -13.60098 4.317668 -3.15 0.002 
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On the other hand age was found to be positive. This shows that as age increases, the probability 
of loan repayment increases. But it is in significant. Similarly, Income from activities financed 
by the loan, loan size, number of times borrowed, loan supervision and education level are 
positively related to loan repayment performance .We have seen that the same conclusion was 
made in the descriptive analysis part. The coefficient for educational level is significant 10% 
level of significance, indicating that with more education borrowers can use the loan efficiently 
and invest on more productive and income generating activities enabling them to settle their loan 
obligation in time. The sign of the variable representing health expenditure and celebrating social 
ceremonies has an expected sign (negative) but insignificant.  
 
Availability of other sources of credit has been included in the estimation and it was found to be 
negatively related to loan repayment performance, consistent with prior expectation. This could 
be a possible explanation for the fact that some borrowers may feel careless in repaying their 
loan if they decide they no more want to borrow from the same source because they can get loan 
from the alternative sources. 
 
Celebration of social ceremonies (CRMN): The results of the logit model reveal that this variable 
affects loan repayment performance negatively, but it is insignificant. The possible explanation is 
that celebration of one or more of social ceremonies needs much material and financial 
resources, which are beyond what the borrowers could afford. This means, the money which 
could have been used for repayment might have been used for the aforementioned purposes. 
Miller (1977), Singh et al., (1985), Mwinijilo (1987), Zeller and Sharma (1996), and Belay 
(1998) have also reported the negative effect of this variable on loan repayment. 
In summary, literacy level, income from activities financed by the loan, loan size and numbers of 
times borrowed are significant factors that enhance the probability of repayment.  
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4.2.2 Evaluation of the Loan Rationing Mechanism 
 
Five out of the nine variables included in the model were found to be significant. According to 
the estimates presented in the table 20, loan diverters, borrowers who take large size of loan, 
borrowers earning more income, borrowers who take adequate loan supervision, borrowers who 
celebrate social ceremonies  and illiterate borrowers are more rationed, i.e., the probability of 
such borrowers being rationed is high. On the other hand, level of education, size of loan, 
celebrate social ceremonies, health expenditure and loan diversion are found to be significant in 
the model. 
Table29 Maximum likelihood estimate of a logit model for loan rationing 
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Logistic regression                                                                              Number of obs   =        113 
                                                                                                             Wald chi2(11)   =      32.70 
                                                                                                              Prob > chi2     =     0.0006 
Log pseudolikelihood = -19.218972                                                    Pseudo R2       =     0.5830 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Significance at 1%               ** Significance at 5%        *** Significance at 10% 
With this brief description of the estimation result, we now go to the evaluation of the loan 
rationing (screening mechanism). According to Hunte (1996), if a variable is positively signed in 
both equations, then the borrower with such a characteristic is correctly identified as 
creditworthy. If it is negatively signed in both equations, then the borrower with such a 
characteristic is correctly identified as non-creditworthy and hence should be rationed. 
 
If on the other hand a variable is positive in the loan repayment equation and negative in the 
rationing equation, then the screening technique is incorrectly rationing a creditworthy borrower. 
Similarly, if a variable is negative in the repayment equation but positive in the rationing 
lr Coef. Robust std.Err z P>|z| 
ag -.0077219 .0342832 -0.23 0.822 
ed .7236101 1.375941 0.53 0.599 
ndl -2.405015 1.840133 -1.31 0.191 
ndp .2819274 .293129 0.96 0.336 
aspv 2.936783*** 1.774805 1.65 0.098 
incom .4502847 .318162 1.42 0.157 
lsz .0003701* .0001152 3.21 0.001 
ld 5.901676* 2.28609 2.58 0.010 
ntb -.325277 .6961287 -0.47 0.640 
Heex -.0106742* .0038102 -2.80 0.005 
Crsc 3.682836*** 1.956485 1.88 0.060 
con -9.0896 3.641883 -2.50 0.013 
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equation, it implies that the borrower having such a characteristic that results in poor loan 
recovery is less rationed while she must have been rationed more. 
 
To proceed with the method of evaluation described above, the estimates of the logit models for 
loan repayment and loan rationing are reproduced in table 21 below for easy reference. 
 
Table30 Comparison of the two estimates 
 
Variables             Loan repayment                          Loan rationing 
coefficients Std. p>/z/ Coefficients Std. p>/z/ 
Ag   .0688239 .0485782 0.157     -.0077219 .0342832 0.822 
Ed 2.904593*** 1.663906 0.081 .7236101 1.375941 0.599 
Ndl -1.583121 1.662803 0.341 -2.405015 1.840133 0.191 
Ndp -.3349244 .4926239 0.497 .2819274 .293129 0.336 
Aspv 1.118842 1.377519 0.417 2.936783*** 1.774805 0.098 
incom 1.164507** .4564657 0.011 .4502847 .318162 0.157 
Lsz .00035** .0001586 0.027 .0003701* .0001152 0.001 
Ld -1.350102 1.074333 0.209 5.901676* 2.28609 0.010 
Ntb 1.793008* .5343741 0.001 -.325277 .6961287 0.640 
Heex -.0035013 .0021299 0.100 -.0106742* .0038102 0.005 
Crsc -.525307 1.10454 0.634 3.682836*** 1.956485 0.060 
 
* Significance at 1%   ** Significance at 5%          *** Significance at 10%  
 
Accordingly borrowers who perceive loan supervision as adequate, borrowers who have high 
level of education, loan size and who have high income from activities financed by the loan are 
correctly identified as being creditworthy and were not rationed or are less rationed. Similarly 
borrowers who have another source of loan and  borrowers whose health expenditure high are 
correctly identified as being noncredit worthy, and hence are rationed. 
 
On the other hand, borrowers who are aged and those who are number of times borrowed high 
are incorrectly rationed despite being creditworthy, while those who are loan diverters, 
borrowers with high numbers of dependents and those who are celebrates social ceremonies are 
less rationed in spite of the fact that they contribute to poor loan recovery rate.  
 
63 
 
Overall according to the evaluation technique given above the screening mechanism employed 
by DECSI Adwa branch seems to be fair (sound), since in six of the eleven variables, the criteria 
used were correct. 
 
Hunte (1996) further went on to investigate signs of the coefficients in conjunction with 
significance of the variable to evaluate the accuracy of the screening technique. Accordingly, 
only one variables is significant in both equations; namely: loan size. So borrowers who receive 
high loan size are correctly identified as being creditworthy   
 
In concluding this section, it is important to point out that although in over half of the criteria 
discussed above the screening technique was sound, there are serious mistakes that are being 
committed. Overall five of the eleven factors were incorrectly used by the institution for 
screening, which necessitates a careful examination of the screening technique being used by the 
institution. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5. Summary, Conclusions and Policy implications  
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5.1 Summary of the findings of the study 
 
In this study attempt was made to look into the factors that affect formal loan repayment 
performance of urban women borrowers of DECSI in Tigray and to evaluate the loan rationing 
mechanism used by the institution. Moreover it assessed the impact of the credit scheme on the 
economic and living conditions of the borrowers. Both descriptive statistics and econometric 
analysis were carried out to accomplish the above-mentioned tasks. 
 
The descriptive statistics show that 32 % of the respondents are defaulters. The majority of the 
respondents are literate (76.33%).  
 
Above 99% of the respondents reported that the repayment period is suitable. This belief is likely 
to have a positive impact on loan repayment. All of the respondents believe that loan from such 
lending institutions is something to be repaid back. Similarly all reported that loan was released 
timely. Regarding group formation and peer pressure issues, almost all of them reported that they 
know each other, monitor each other’s actions and impose sanctions on members that default. 
These issues may have contributed to a relatively better repayment rate. Regarding loan 
utilization 27.81% of the respondents have violated loan agreement, their main reasons being 
inconsistency of the agreement is the loan amount was not enough for the intended purpose and 
to repay another loan. 
 
More than half of the respondents had some source of income prior to the loan scheme, their 
main source being petty trade. Currently 26.42% earn an income level of above Birr 5000 after 
using the loan from DECSI. This improvement has to be seen against the average number of 
dependents of 1.72. 
 
A large proportion (98.82%) is now having saving account of the institution, while only 12.43% 
was having saving personally before the launching of the credit scheme. This is one area of a 
positive contribution of the institution.  
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With the aim of identifying the determinants of loan repayment, an attempt was made to compare 
defaulters with non-defaulters. Accordingly the former were found to be on average a bit 
younger, illiterate, and loan diverters. They also receive a smaller loan amounts, earn smaller 
income, support more dependents than the non-defaulters.  
 
The same analysis was done on loan rationing. Accordingly, borrowers high level of education, 
applied for larger loan amount, whose income is high, those celebrate social ceremonies, 
perceive loan supervision adequacy, loan diverters, availability of another loan and who support 
more dependents are rationed.  
 
Factors that are found to be significant determinants of loan repayment performance were level 
of education, income financed from the loan, loan size and number of times borrowed. All of 
these factors increase the probability of loan repayment. Even though they are insignificant, 
availability of another loan, loan diversion, number of dependents, medical expenses and 
celebrating social ceremonies reduce the loan repayment performance. 
 
These findings tally with those in the descriptive statistics mentioned above with the exception of 
loan size. Similar results were obtained regarding age, loan diversion and supervision in Berhanu 
(1999) and Mengistu (1997), while that of education and income is same in Abrham(2002), 
Reta(2000), Berhanu (1999) and Mengistu (1997) . 
 
Coming to the screening technique, the empirical evidences show that although there were some 
problems of separating between creditworthy borrowers from those who are not,  in most of the 
cases the technique was found to be good. Factors like borrowers who are aged and number of 
times borrowed are incorrectly rationed despite being creditworthy, while those who are loan 
diverters, number of dependent and who are celebrates social ceremonies are less rationed in 
spite of the fact that they contribute to poor loan recovery rate.  
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Overall according to the evaluation technique given above the screening mechanism employed 
by DECSI Adwa branch seems to be fair (sound), since in six of the eleven variables, the criteria 
used were correct. 
 
Comparison of the studies that were conducted with somehow similar objectives as the current 
one is presented below. Looking at the determinants of loan repayment there seems to be a 
consensus in the findings (sign), particularly concerning the variables education, income, loan 
size, loan supervision and loan diversion. Regarding evaluation of the loan rationing mechanism 
similar findings were obtained in terms of the signs of loan size and loan supervision. Studies 
that assessed impact as one of their objectives were Retta(2000), Teferi(2000) and 
Berhanu(1999), and all them had similar findings, that the credit schemes have contributed 
positively to the improvement of the living condition of their beneficiaries. 
 
5.2 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
Based on the major findings of this study, the following conclusions could be drawn along with 
some policy implications to be brought to the attention of the institution and any other interested 
parties. 
 
Generally the evidences in the study reveal that the overall repayment performance of urban 
women  borrowers and the screening technique, which the institution follows to ration loan to its 
clients, were found to be sound.  
 
The other significant determinant that was found to enhance the repayment performance was 
loan size. This implies that there is a need to determine an appropriate loan amount that just 
suffices the project cost or purpose of the borrowing, through a thorough investigation of the 
demand for loans and proposals/plans submitted by borrowers. 
 
Factors like income, age, level education, adequacy of supervision, income, number of times 
borrowed and loan size were found to enhance the probability of repayment. Although designing 
the lending strategy in such a way that factors enhancing the repayment performance are duly 
taken in to account can be recommended in general, this needs a great care. For instance income 
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was found to significantly increase the probability of repaying loan in full. But it is not 
recommended to exclude those with low income hoping to reduce loan default, since this 
contradicts the very objective of MFIs. 
 
In line with the basic idea of improving the loan repayment performance, the screening of 
borrowers deserves good attention. From the evidence provided in this study, borrowers who are 
aged and number of times borrowed were incorrectly rationed despite their being creditworthy, 
while those loan diverters, those have high number of dependets and those who are celebrating 
social ceremonies were rationed less despite their being non-creditworthy. 
 
Moreover we have seen that only one out of eleven variable that were significant in the loan 
repayment equation were also found significant in the rationing equation during the comparison 
of the two equations that was made to evaluate the rationing mechanism. This means that 
important information is being ignored as in the case where some variables contributing to good 
repayment performance are neglected when it comes to the use of these variables in identifying 
good borrowers with such characteristics. So another area of focus as far as rationing is 
concerned should be towards using more of the factors that can be used for identifying clients 
into creditworthy and non-creditworthy, while at the same time the institution should attempt to 
avoid incorrect use of such factors as criteria for rationing. 
 
Finally there are some important points that may need further investigation. These issues may 
serve as points of departure for further research. We have seen that complementarily was 
observed between the credit scheme of DECSI and that of the moneylenders operating in the area 
of study. Since from the data collected for this study the number of respondents that reported 
having access to other credit sources is very high, this finding needs to be further studied. Also 
there may be a need to test if there is some sort of association between loan repayment and 
purpose of borrowing.  
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Annex I logit estimation of loan repayment performance 
                  
       _cons    -13.60098   4.317668    -3.15   0.002    -22.06345   -5.138502
        crsc     -.525307    1.10454    -0.48   0.634    -2.690166    1.639552
        heex    -.0035013   .0021299    -1.64   0.100    -.0076758    .0006732
         ntb     1.793008   .5343741     3.36   0.001     .7456545    2.840362
          ld    -1.350102   1.074333    -1.26   0.209    -3.455755    .7555511
         lsz       .00035   .0001586     2.21   0.027     .0000393    .0006608
       incom     1.164507   .4564657     2.55   0.011     .2698504    2.059163
        aspv     1.118842   1.377519     0.81   0.417    -1.581047    3.818731
         ndp    -.3349244   .4926239    -0.68   0.497    -1.300449    .6306007
         ndl    -1.583121   1.662803    -0.95   0.341    -4.842154    1.675913
          ed     2.904593   1.663906     1.75   0.081    -.3566029     6.16579
          ag     .0688239   .0485782     1.42   0.157    -.0263876    .1640353
                                                                              
          lr        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood = -14.762433                 Pseudo R2       =     0.7837
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(11)   =      46.88
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        113
Iteration 6:   log pseudolikelihood = -14.762433  
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -14.762433  
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -14.764022  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -14.983982  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -17.226278  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -23.156875  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -68.247943  
 
Annex II logit estimation for rationing 
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       _cons      -9.0896   3.641883    -2.50   0.013    -16.22756   -1.951641
        crsc     3.682836   1.956485     1.88   0.060    -.1518048    7.517477
        heex    -.0106742   .0038102    -2.80   0.005    -.0181421   -.0032062
         ntb     -.325277   .6961287    -0.47   0.640    -1.689664     1.03911
          ld     5.901676    2.28609     2.58   0.010     1.421023    10.38233
         lsz     .0003701   .0001152     3.21   0.001     .0001442     .000596
       incom     .4502847    .318162     1.42   0.157    -.1733013    1.073871
        aspv     2.936783   1.774805     1.65   0.098    -.5417711    6.415338
         ndp     .2819274    .293129     0.96   0.336    -.2925948    .8564497
         ndl    -2.405015   1.840133    -1.31   0.191     -6.01161     1.20158
           d     .7236101   1.375941     0.53   0.599    -1.973184    3.420404
          ag    -.0077219   .0342832    -0.23   0.822    -.0749158     .059472
                                                                              
         lrn        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood = -19.218972                 Pseudo R2       =     0.5830
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0006
                                                  Wald chi2(11)   =      32.70
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        113
Iteration 7:   log pseudolikelihood = -19.218972  
Iteration 6:   log pseudolikelihood = -19.218972  
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -19.218982  
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -19.224787  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -19.453689  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -21.724287  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood =   -27.8587  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -46.086439  
 
 
Annex III The Survey Questionnaire 
Questionnaire 
 
KEBELE ________________________ 
ENNUMERATOR____________________ 
DATE______________________________ 
 
I: PERSONAL DETAILS 
 
1.1 Name of Borrower____________________  
1.2 Age__________ 
1.3 Marital Status________ 1. Single  2. married  3.divorced    4. widowed 
1.4 Educational level _______ 1. Illiterate  2. grade1-8  3. grade 9-12  4. above grade 12 
1.5 Number of dependents: With in the household ______Outside the household______ 
1.6 Occupation: Main_______________ Second______________ Third_______________ 
 
II: INFORMATION ON GROUP FORMATION 
 
2.1 How many members does the group in which you belong have?___ 1) 3   2) 5  3)10 
2.2 Did you know all (most) of the members in your group? ___ 1.Yes 0.No 
2.3 Did you feel responsible to other members of your group?____ 1. Yes 0. No 
2.4 Did you have the feeling that you might be sued in case of failure to repay the loan?___ 
1.Yes    0.No 
2.5 Do you attempt to know or monitor the loan utilization of the other members of your 
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group?____ 1.Yes 0. No 
2.6 If yes, what action do you take in case you observe wrong utilization of the loan, say 
usage of loan for non-intended purpose?___ 1) Inform DECSI  2) Accuse the diverter 
3) Put social sanction       4) Other(specify)________________________ 
 
III: LOAN AND ITS REPAYMENT 
 
3.1 Did you have any source of credit other than DECSI?___ 1. Yes 0. No 
3.2 If yes, what is your source?__ 1)Iddir 2)Money lenders 3)Friends/relatives 4) Banks 5) Other 
3.3 How many times and how much money did you receive from these sources during the past 
12 months? 
Source year Amount of loan 
   
   
   
   
3.4 Have you finished repayment on loan from these sources?____ 1. Yes 2. No 
3.5 How much money did you receive in loan from DECSI credit scheme?    
3.6 Is the repayment period set by DECSI suitable in your opinion?___ 1.Yes 0. No 
3.7 If no, recommend a suitable repayment period:___________________ 
3.8 Was the loan issued timely? _____ 1. Yes 0. No 
3.9 If no, what was the impact of the delay?___________________________           
_______________________________________________ 
3.10 What is the status of recent loan? _______ 
   1. Fully repaid   2. Repayment on schedule  3. Repayment in arrears 
3.11 If in arrears what is the balance remaining?_________ 
3.12 What was the problem for the loan to be in arrears? 
         1. Loan based business activity was not profitable 
         2. Used some of the loan for household living expense 
         3. Sold on credit but did not get paid back on time 
         4. Loss of assets acquired by the loan 
         5. Other (specify)_____________________________ 
3.13 Do you perceive the cost of default to be high? ______  1. Yes    0. No 
3.14 If yes, which of the following is the most important in forcing you to repay the loan in time? 
        1. Claim against personal wealth 
        2. Claim against guarantors 
        3. Social sanctions (e.g. loss of social status) 
        4. Fear of losing another loan in future 5) Other (specify)_____________ 
 
IV: LOAN UTILIZATION 
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4.1 What was the purpose for which the loan was taken ?____ 
     1. Petty trade      2. Purchase of  urban agricultural inputs   3.Fattening      
     4. Other (specify)____________ 
4.2 Was the amount of loan you took enough for the purpose intended? ____ 
     1. Yes   0. No 
4.3 If no, what was the amount you requested? Birr_______ 
4.4 Did you spend the entire loan on purposes specified in the loan agreement? __    
     1. Yes 0. No 
4.5 If no, state those non-intended purposes and the amount spent on them 
             Purpose                                          Amount spent (Birr) 
   1_________________________             ________________ 
   2_________________________             ________________ 
   3_________________________              ________________ 
   4_________________________             ________________ 
 
4.6 What was/were the reason(s) for spending part/entire loan on non intended purposes?_____ 
      1. The loan amount was not enough for the intended purpose 
      2. The loan agreement did not coincide with my initial intention 
      3. Market problem 4. To repay another loan 5. To make a more profitable business 
6. Other (specify)___________________ 
 
V: SUPERVISION, ADVISORY VISITS AND TRAINING 
 
 
5.1 Have you ever been supervised regarding loan utilization by DECSI staff? 
     1. Yes  0. No 
5.2 Have you ever been supervised for loan repayment? ___ 1. Yes      0. No 
5.3 If yes to either on. No. 5.1 or 5.2, how many times were you supervised? ___ 
5.4 If yes to either 5.1 or 5.2, was it adequate in your opinion?_____ 1.Yes   0. No 
5.5 Do you consider supervision as being important for loan repayment? ___ 1. Yes  0. No 
5.6 Did you get any training before receiving loan? _____ 1.Yes    0. No 
5.7 If yes, what kind of training was it? _____ 
      1.Business  2. Marketing  3. Saving  4. Book keeping  5. Other (specify) 
5.8 Do you think that the training has helped you increase your income? ___ 1. Yes 0. No 
 
VI: INCOME AND WEALTH 
6.1 Did you have a source of income (cash income) for your household before 2012 fiscal years, 
i.e. before joining the DECSI program loan? ____1. Yes 0. No 
 6.2 If yes, what was/were the source(s) and level of your income? 
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      Source                                             Annual Income 
   __________________                           ______________ 
   __________________                           ______________ 
  __________________                           ______________ 
6.3 What was your annual income from activities financed by the loan during the last 12 months? 
  1.Below Birr 1000                        2.  Between Birr 1001-2000 
  3.Between Birr 2001- 3000            4.  Between Birr 3001-4000 
  5.Between Birr 4001-5000             6.  Above Birr 5000 
6.4 Do you have other/new sources of income currently? ___ 1. Yes 0. No 
6.5 If yes, what are these other sources and your annual income from them? 
     Source                                                   Annual Income 
 _______________                                      _____________ 
 ________________                                     _____________ 
6.6 What is the estimated value of your assets currently? 
       1.Below Birr 1,000                               2.Between Birr 1,001-3,000 
 3.Between Birr 3,001- 5,000                4.Between Birr 5,001-7,000 
       5.Between Birr 7,001-10,000               6.Above Birr 10,000 
6.7 Did/do you've your own house? ___ 1. Yes 0. No 
6.8 If No, how much did you pay for rent?    
 
VII: MEDICAL EXPENDITURE AND ACCESS TO MEDICAL SERVICES 
 
7.1 Do your family and yourself have access to health services currently? ______ 
          1.Yes     0. No 
7.2 If no, go to 8.3. Otherwise who was the bearer of the medical expense? ______ 
          1.Myself                             4. Served free 
          2.Other family members        5.Myself and other family members 
          3.Relatives                         6. Others (specify) 
7.3 What is your average annual medical expenditure during the last 12 months?  Birr_____ 
7.4 Do you think that your annual medical expenditure has increased over the past 5 or so years? 
         1.Yes    0. No 
7.5 How much was the average annual medical expenditure before 5 years? Birr_____ 
7.6 Do you think that your access to medical facilities has improved after your participation in 
the credit scheme?____ 1. Yes 0. No 
7.7 If no, what do you think is the main reason(s)? ____ 
    1. Shortage of medical facilities                  3. Low level of income 
    2. Unaffordable cost of medical services    4. Other( specify)____________ 
 
VIII: EDUCATIONAL EXPENSE AND ACCESS TO EDUCATION 
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8.1 If you have children and other dependents, 
- How many of them were going to school during the last academic year? ______ 
- How much was your total annual educational expense last year? Birr________ 
- How many children were you sending to school before 5 years?________ 
- How much was your total annual expense on education at that time (5 years back)?   Br_____ 
8.2 Do you think that there is improvement of access to educational facilities of you and your 
family?___ 1. Yes 0. No 
8.3 If no, please indicate the main reasons? ___ 
      1. Lack of educational facilities 
      2. Unaffordable cost of educational facilities 
      3. Low level of income 
      4. Distance of educational facilities 5. Other( specify)_____________ 
 
IX :EXPENDITURE FOR CELEBRATION OF SOCIAL FESTIVALS  
 
9.1 Did you celebrated social ceremonies in 2012 fiscal year? 1. yes 0. no 
      9.2 If yes, what was the celebrated social ceremonies? 
            1. wedding                       4. Circumcision     
            2. Funeral ceremonies        5. Tsiwa mahber 
            3. engagement                    6. others     (specify) __________ 
             
9.3 For these ceremonies, how much do you estimate to have invested on it? _________ 
9.4 The source of the money you invested ____________ 
 
X. CONSUMPTION AND LIVING CONDITIONS 
 
10.1 What is the average annual consumption expenditure of your household: 
      - During the last twelve months? Birr_________ 
- Before some five years, i.e., before prior to participation in the credi?   Birr____________ 
10.2 Who was the bearer: During the last 12 months?____ Before credit?__________ 
   1.Myself 2.Other family members 3.Myself and other family members 
   4.Donors 5. Other (Specify) 
10.3 What is the status of the household diet currently after the credit?___ 
1. Improved 2. Same 3. Worsened 
10.4 If it has improved, do you think the nutritional status has improved after program 
participation?____ 1.Yes 0. No 
 
XI. MARKET SITUATION AND CREDIT BENEFIT 
 
11.1 Please list the major products and/or services produced from your business that 
is financed by the loan from DECSI? 
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1.___________________________ 
2.___________________________ 
3.___________________________ 
11.2 How was the demand for your product?___ 1. High 2. Average 3. Low 
11.3 If increased, what do you think is the reason? 
    1. Sufficient fund     2.Availability of market     5. Other (Specify)___ 
     3. Favorable price    4.Quality advantage _______________ 
 
XII. INFORMATION ON OTHER ISSUES 
 
12.1 Did you have a saving account before participating in the credit scheme of DECSI?____  
          1. Yes       0. No 
12.2 If yes, what is the average amount that you manage to save monthly? Birr_____ 
12.3 Do you have a saving account after program participation?____ 1. Yes 0. No 
12.4 If yes, what is the average monthly amount of your saving? Birr______ 
11.5 Do you keep accounting records? ______ 1. Yes 0. No 
12.6 If yes, for what purpose? 
   1) To evaluate profit and loss   2) For loan repayment purpose   3) Other (specify)_________ 
12.7 If no, explain the reason(s) of not keeping records? 
       1. Lack of knowledge 
        2. Transaction too small to keep a record 
        3. Other (specify)__________________ 
12.8 Has your living condition improved in general because of your participation in the credit 
scheme?____ 1. Yes 2. No 
12.10 What is your overall opinion about the credit scheme? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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